Electronically Filed

9/2020 4:32 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

8/1

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN

Supreme Court Docket N0. 46912-2019

TRICORE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

an Idaho limited

liability

company,

Plaintiff-Respondent/ Cross-Appellant,

THE ESTATE OF FRANCES ELAINE WARREN,

deceased, acting through the Court-

Appointed Co-Personal Representatives, DANIEL ROBERT WARREN and CHRISTOPHER
GEORGE WARREN; PLBM, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; JOHN STOCKTON, an
individual; and TODD BRINKMEYER, an individual,
Defendants—Appellants/ Cross—Respondents.

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF
ﬁled 0n behalf of

The

Estate 0f Frances Elaine Warren,

Appeal from the

PLBM LLC, and John Stockton

First Judicial District for

Bonner County

Case N0. CV-2016-1427

The Honorable Barbara Buchanan,

For Appellants Estate 0f Frances Elaine

PLBM, LLC, and John Stockton:
James A. McPhee, ISB No. 5593
Witherspoon Brajcich McPhee, PLLC
601 W. Main Ave., Suite 714
99201
Spokane,
Warren,

WA

For Respondent Tricore Investments, LLC:
Kevin W. Roberts, ISB N0. 6305
Roberts Freeboum,

1325

W.

Spokane,

1st

PLLC

Ave., Suite 303

WA 99201

Brent C. Featherston, ISB N0. 4602
Featherston

113

S.

Law Firm, CHTD.

2nd Ave.

Sandpoint, ID 83864

District

Judge

For Appellant Brinkmever:
Michael J. Hines, ISB No. 6876
Reid G. Johnson, pro hac vice
Lukins & Annis, P.S.

717 W. Sprague Ave., Suite 1600
99201
Spokane,

WA

W. Christopher Pooser, ISB #5525
Anna E. Courtney, ISBA N0. 9279
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capital Boulevard, Suite 1900
Boise, ID 83702-7705

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION
REPLY ARGUMENT

.......................................................................................................... ii

..........................................................................................................................

1

........................................................................................................

2

I.

A.

Additional Standard of Review ............................................................................... 2

B.

The Tricore PSA did not comply with the statute 0f frauds. .................................. 2
The legal description in the Tricore PSA did not comply with
1.
the statute 0f frauds ..................................................................................... 2

5.

acknowledge” the Tricore PSA
or otherwise remove the agreement from the statute of frauds ................... 4
Reference t0 the general quantity and identity 0f property does
not satisfy the statute of frauds. .................................................................. 6
The Tricore PSA was not a development agreement, and the
bankruptcy cases Cited by Tricore d0 not apply t0 this case. ...................... 7
Whether Stockton‘s Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement

6.

Lexington Heights controls the statute of frauds analysis ......................... 10

2.

3.

4.

The

parties did not “mutually

contained a provision reserving real property
C.

is

irrelevant ....................... 10

The Tricore PSA fails because there was no meeting of the minds ......................
The trial court erred by applying the wrong legal analysis t0 its
1.
unchallenged ﬁndings that there was n0 meeting 0f the minds
regarding a 3 1 8-f00t section of waterfront
2.

...............................................

There was n0 meeting 0f the minds 0n whether
less than

200

feet

title t0

11

11

the “not

0f waterfront” retained by the Estate would

ever transfer t0 Tricore .............................................................................. 15

D.

Tricore repudiated the Tricore

18

2.
3.

Repudiation does not require a writing t0 complywith the statute

4.

0f frauds

....................................................................................................

Tricore’s

demand

Tricore
5.

The

PSA

Estate

The

trial

for concessions demonstrates

it

limited t0 contract remedies

when

it

23

upon Tricore’s

................................................................................................

court erred

20

repudiated the

..............................................................................................

was not

repudiation
E.

PSA ......................................................................

The evidence at trial established repudiation by Tricore .......................... 18
The Estate is not barred from arguing repudiation ................................... 19

1.

24

held Stockton liable for tortious interference

With a contract ....................................................................................................... 24
1.

There was no valid contract and, as a result, Tricore cannot maintain
an action for tortious interference ............................................................. 24

2.

The

trial

right
a.

court’s ﬁndings established the existence 0f Stockton’s

0f ﬁrst refusal

...................................................................................

The deadman’s

statute, I.R.E.

25

601, and I.R.E. 801 d0 not apply.. 26

b.

Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal

c.

The bona ﬁde purchaser

d.

The

statute

was not

subject t0 the

0f frauds ............................................................................. 27
for value doctrine does not

apply t0 Tricore ............................................................................. 29
Estate did not offer the same property to Stockton

and Brinkmeyer ............................................................................. 30
trial court misapplied the law regarding improper
purpose and justiﬁcation ............................................................... 31
The trial court erred in concluding a civil conspiracy existed .............................. 32
The Appellants are not jointly and severally liable for damages .......................... 34
The trial court erred by ﬁnding a Violation of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act ....................................................................................................... 34
The trial court’s attorney fee award was error ...................................................... 35
The trial court erred in ﬁnding the Appellants jointly and
1.

The

e.

F.

G.

H.

I.

severally liable for Tricore’s attorney fees

The

2.

...............................................

35

court erred in awarding attorney fees under the

trial

Idaho Consumer Protection Act ................................................................ 37

The

3.

Tricore

4.

court erred in awarding attorney fees t0 Tricore

trial

because

it

ls

not entitled t0

CONCLUSION
CROSS APPEAL ARGUMENT

II.

them ........................................................... 38
attorney fees 0n appeal ...................................... 38

failed to apportion

.................................................................................................................

III.

A.

Tricore

B.

The

is

trial

......................................................................................

money damages ............................................................. 39

court correctly found that conﬂicting evidence 0f value

C.

precluded damages ................................................................................................ 40
Tricore failed t0 prove “loss 0f use” damages ...................................................... 45

D.

Tricore failed t0 prove “funds expended” damages .............................................. 46

E.

Tricore failed to prove damages under the Idaho

CONCLUSION

IV.

not entitled t0

39
39

Consumer Protection Act ........ 47

.................................................................................................................

48

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ackerschott

v.

Mountain View Hospital, LLC, 166 Idaho 223 (2020) ........................................... 39

Applied Equipment Corp.

v.

Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd, 869 P.2d 854 (1994) ................................ 33

Argyle

v.

Slewmaker, 99 Idaho 544 (1978) .................................................................................... 27

Bailey

v.

Ewing, 105 Idaho 636

Barry

BECO

(Ct.

App. 1983) ........................................................................... 13

Paciﬁc West C0nstr., Ina, 140 Idaho 827 (2004) ............................................................ 12
Const. C0,, Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Ina, 145 Idaho 719 (2008) ...................................... 31

v.

Bergeman

v.

Select Portfolio Servicing, 164 Idaho

ii

498 (2018)

....................................................

39

Brothers

Bums

Arave, 67 Idaho 171 (1946)

v.

Concrete, Inc.

v.

Teton County, 161 Idaho 117 (2016)

Caldwell Land and Cattle,

Campbell
Castorena

v.

v.

Doe v. Doe,
Duspiva

v.

First Sec.

Foley

(Idaho 2018)

1

Frantz

General Auto Parts C0.,

N.A.

Nat. ASS

v.

Inc.

v.

32

S VCO.,

v.

Idaho Power C0.

Old

’n v.

Rogers, 91 Idaho 654 (1967)

.....................................

22, 23

..................................................................................

40, 41

..............................................................................
.............................................................

v.

v.

(Ct.

App. 1986)

18, 19,

21

10, 28,

29

16,

47

............................

........................................................

Barker, 133 Idaho 330 (1999)
(Ct.

28, 29

.......................................................

31

App. 1998) ........................................................................... 8

Chilson Family Trust, 165 Ariz. 469 (1990) .............................................. 13

Cutters,

v.

Ina, 102 Idaho 187 (1981) ...................................................................... 10, 28

Idaho Pub.

Utils.

Comm ’n,

102 Idaho 744 (1981)

488 B.R. 130 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012)

In re Ricks, 433 B.R. 806 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010)

v.

Wood, 124 Idaho 342

(Ct.

App. 1993)

........................................

35

............................................................

8,

9

......................................................................

8,

9

In re Sterling Min. C0,, 415 B.R. 762 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009)

Jackson

34

Winey, 126 Idaho 993 (Ct. App. 1995) ........................................................................... 19

v.

Hoﬁ’man

.........................................................

Genuine Parts C0., 132 Idaho 849 (1999)

Hough, 132 Idaho 203

v.

Hill—SchaferP’ship

In re

...................................................................................

Babler, 103 Idaho 663 (1982) ...................................................................................... 25

Highland Enterprises, Ina,

Hinkle

25

2000)

Webster, 119 Idaho 262 (1991) ................................................. 36

v.

Hancock v. Dusenberry, 110 Idaho 147
Hilbert

38

..................................................

(3rd. Cir.

Parke, 111 Idaho 1005 (Ct. App. 1986)

v.

Gyurkey

................................................................................

Fillmore, 154 Idaho 27 (2013) ............................................................................... 34, 35

Munio, 105 Idaho 309 (1983)

v.

8

160 Idaho 854 (2016) ........................................................................................... 20, 29

Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126 (1964)

v.

.........................................................................

Amusement, Ina, 160 Idaho 307 (2016)

Bank ofldaho,
Bank ofldaho,

First Sec.

Fish

LLC, 158 Idaho 957 (2015) .............................................. 40

Mattson, 4O Idaho 378 (1925)

Interstate

v.

Center,

General Motors Corp, 215 F.3d 386

v.

Dahlquist

Doble

7

Allied Pharmacy Management, Inc, 871 S.W. 2d 929 (1994) ....................................... 22

v.

Crivelli

.........................................................

Mission Mountain Interests, Ltd, C0., 135 Idaho 239 (2000) ............................ 6

Latimer, 165 Idaho

v.

Collins

v.

12, 13, 16

Johnson Thermal Systems, Ina, 165 Idaho 787 (2019) .......... 41

General Elea, 149 Idaho 609 (2010)

City ofKellogg

Clarke

LLC v.

Parkway Surgery

v.

............................................................................

.......................................................

.........................................................................

8

47
20

Jensen

v.

Chandler, 77 Idaho 303 (1955)

Justad

v.

Ward, 147 Idaho 509 (2009) ........................................................................................... 12

Kelly

v.

Hodges, 119 Idaho 872

Konic Int’l Corp.
Leingang

v.

v.

Spokane

(Ct.

................................................................................

18,

App. 1991) ......................................................................... 4, 5

Svcs., Ina,

109 Idaho 527

Pierce Cty. Med. Bureau, Inc. 131

(Ct.

App. 1985) ............................... 13, 15

Wn.2d 133 (1997)

iii

..............................................

32

LLC v.

Lexington Heights Dev.,
Liebelt

Liebelt,

v.

Linscott

Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276 (2004) ................................... passim

118 Idaho 845

(Ct.

App. 1990)

.............................................................

Rainier Nat. Life Ins. C0,, 100 Idaho 854 (1980)

v.

Lockridge

v.

Amalgamated Ass ’n

0fSt., Elec. Ry.

14, 18,

........................................................

Lowery

Lowry

Federal Rubber C0., 85 F.2d 129

Board 0fC0unly

v.

Comm ’rsfor Ada

(8th Cir.

1936)

36

................................................................

27

191 Cal.App.

435 (2010) ............................................................................................................................ 23

Mikesell

Mueller

v.
v.

Nicholson

Nunez

v.

Inc.

Hill,
v.

(Ct.

v.

Home Living Service,

v.

105 Idaho 504 (1983) ................. 25

App. 1992) ............................................... 28

161 Idaho 877 (2017)

136 Idaho 835 (2002)

Johnson, 163 Idaho 692 (Ct. App. 2018)
v.

Inc.

.....................................................................................

CoeurD ’Alene Placer Mining Corp,

P.O. Ventures, Inc.

.............................

28, 29

..........................................

36

........................................................................

39

Jones, 455 S.W. 3d. 753 (TeX. App. 2015)

Loucks Family Irrevocable

21, 22

Trust,

..................................

22

144 Idaho 233 (2007) ..................... 13, 16

Intermountain Gas Ca, 103 Idaho 217 (1982) ................................................................. 24

Potts Const. C0.
v.

Meridian Athletic ASS ’n,

158 Idaho 208 (2015)

Petrohawk Properties, L.P.

v.

v.

Newworld Dev. Corp, 122 Idaho 868

Northwest Bec-Corp.

Ray

23

Estate ofSnyder, 131 Idaho 689 (1998) ................................................................. 26, 27

v.

Meridian Bowling Lanes,

Pope

26

.................

Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town ofMammoth Lakes,
4th

14,

...................................................

County, 115 Idaho 64 (Ct. App. 1988)

Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708 (Ct. App. 1989)

v.

Lunders

v.

33

& Motor

Coach Emp. 0fAm., 93 Idaho 294 (1969) ....................................................................... 2,
Lowenstein

20

v.

N. Kootenai Water District, 141 Idaho 678 (2005)

Frasure, 146 Idaho 625 (2009)

Regional Enterprises,

352 F.2d 768
Rockefeller

v.

Inc.

(9th Cir.

v.

Teachers

1965)

........................................

.....................................................................................

Ins.

& Annuity Ass

’n

15

3, 7, 8

ofAmerica,

.....................................................................................................

23

Grabow, 136 Idaho 637 (2001) ............................................................................... 38

Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105 (1999)

Rowley

v.

Rush

Anestos, 104 Idaho 630 (1983) .......................................................................................... 22

v.

Russell

v.

Russell,

.....................................................................................

6

99 Idaho 151 (1978) ....................................................................................... 3, 4

Saint Alphonsus Diversiﬁed Care, Inc.

v.

MRIAssociates, LLP, 157 Idaho 106 (2014) .32, 33, 36

Seward v. MusickAuction, LLC, 164 Idaho 149 (2018) ................................................................ 13
Silicon Intern Ore, LLC v. Monsanto C0,, 155 Idaho 538 (2013) ................................................. 10
Silver

Sines

Creek Computers,
v.

Slusser

Smith

v.

Inc.

v.

Maddox, 122 Wn.App. 1023, 2004
v.

..............................................

45

............................................................

25

Petra, Ina, 136 Idaho 879 (2002)

WL

1528236

Aumock, 56 Idaho 793 (1936) ........................................................................................ 10

Smith, 95 Idaho 477 (1973) .............................................................................................. 27

SMS Financial, LLC v. CBC Financial Corporation,

iV

2107

UT 9O (2017)

...................................

21

Southeastern

Land Fund,

Syringa Networks,
Taylor

v.

Just,

Inc.

LLC v.

v.

Real Estate World, Ina, 237 Ga. 227 (1976)

Idaho Dep ’t ofAdmin, 155 Idaho 55 (2013)

The David and Marvel Benton Trust
Thirsty’s L.L.C.

v.

v.

Tolerico, 143 Idaho

Thurston Enterprises, Inc.

Trunnell

App. 2001)

v.

Weitz

48 (2006)

...................................................................

Wilson

v.

36, 37

Safeguard Business Systems, Ina, 164 Idaho 709 (2019) ............... 41
v.

Woods, 135 Idaho

..................................................................................................................

v.

Prudential Ins. C0. ofAmerica, 140 Ariz. 238 (Ct. App. 1983)

Green, 148 Idaho 851 (2010)

v.

34

McCarty, 161 Idaho 145 (2016) ........................................ 7

28

.........

2O

..............................................................................

38

...........................................................................................

41

Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497 (1996)

v.

24

Fergel, 153 Idaho 68 (2012) ........................................................................................ 29

v.

United California Bank

Weaver

.......................................

...................................................................................

Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A.
(Ct.

21

138 Idaho 137, (2002) ............................................................................................ 29

Taylor v McNichols, 149 Idaho 826 (2010)

485

............................

Hayes, 77 A.3d 392 (DC. 2013) .............................................................................. 39, 4O

Statutes
I.C.

§9-503

...............................................................................................................................

20, 28

LC. §6—1604(1) ............................................................................................................................... 33
I.C. §12-120(3) ......................................................................................................................... 36, 38
I.C.P.A §48-603(17) ...................................................................................................................... 35
LC. §12-121 ................................................................................................................................... 38
I.C. §48-608(1) ............................................................................................................................... 47

Other
3 Williston
I.R.E.

601

I.R.E. 801

0n Contracts

§7: 13 (4th ed.) ......................................................................................... 10

.......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................

26
27

Restatement (Second) of Contracts §20(1) .................................................................................... 13
Restatement (Second) 0f Contracts §250 ...................................................................................... 21
Restatement (Second) of Torts §767 .............................................................................................. 32
Restatement (Second) of Torts §773 .............................................................................................. 32

Rules
I.R.C.P. 8(c)(1) ................................................................................................................................. 6
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) ............................................................................................................................. 35

I.A.R. 14(b)(3)
I.A.R. 35(h)

...............................................................................................................................

........................................................................................................................

36

24, 30, 32

INTRODUCTION
The

Estate 0f Frances Elaine

Warren

PLBM, LLC

John Stockton, and

(the Estate),

(collectively the Appellants) ask this Court to reverse the trial court’s

judgment ordering speciﬁc

performance of a real estate purchase and sale agreement between Tricore Investments,

(M) and

the Estate for property the Estate

owned along

Priest

Lake

(the Tricore

LLC

PSA). The

arguments presented by Tricore in Respondent Tricore’s Brief cannot retroactively repair the
deﬁciencies of the Tricore PSA.
record, the Tricore

PSA was

As shown by

not enforceable.

legal description 0f property t0

It

the trial court’s unchallenged ﬁndings

and the

violated the statute 0f frauds for lack 0f a precise

be excluded from the

sale

— “not

less than

200

reserved and retained by the Estate. There was n0 meeting 0f the minds as to

feet

0f waterfront”

how much

land was

being bought and sold — Whether 318 feet 0f valuable waterfront was included 0r excluded from
the sale.

And there was n0 meeting 0f the minds as to who would hold title to the excluded property

during platting

— whether

title t0

the “not less than

200

feet

With the Estate or transfer to Tricore and be transferred back
court erroneously ruled that the Tricore

PSA was

0f waterfront” would remain vested
at a later date.

Despite

enforceable and that Tricore

that, the trial

was

entitled to a

judgment ordering speciﬁc performance.

Even

if

an enforceable contract had been formed, the

and the record establish
refusal

and

that this right

trial

court’s unchallenged ﬁndings

that

Mr. Stockton purchased the property by exercising a right 0f ﬁrst

was

valid and superior t0

court’s conclusions that Stockton

all others,

including Tricore.

As

such, the

trial

and Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered With the Tricore PSA, that

they conspired With the Estate to breach

it,

and

that the Estate is liable

under the Idaho Consumer

Protection Act cannot be sustained. In any event, the evidence supports a conclusion that Tricore

repudiated the Tricore

PSA by

signiﬁcant concessions after

it

insisting

it

realized that

thought. Finally, and as discussed below, the

would not move forward unless the Estate made
it

was purchasing 318

trial

feet less waterfront than

it

court further erred in awarding attorney fees t0

Tricore against the Appellants.

In

its

cross-appeal, Tricore argues that

evidence supports the

it

is

entitled t0

damages. However, substantial

court’s decision that Tricore failed t0 prove

trial

damages with any

reasonable certainty for “loss 0f use,” increased development costs, and lost proﬁts which were,
in the

words 0f the

trial court,

The judgment

“pulled out 0f thin air.”

against the Estate, Mr. Stockton, and

attorney fees must be awarded t0 the Estate, and the

to

trial

PLBM, LLC must be reversed,

court’s ruling that Tricore

not entitled

damages must be afﬁrmed.

REPLY ARGUMENT

I.

Additional Standard 0f Review.

A.

Findings of fact t0 which no assignment 0f error has been
the

Supreme Court. Lockridge

Am,
B.

is

v.

Amalgamated Ass’n

made

0fSt., Elec. Ry.

are necessarily binding

&

on

Motor Coach Emp. 0f

93 Idaho 294, 304, 460 P.2d 719, 729 (1969), reV’d 0n other grounds, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).

The Tricore PSA did not complv with
1.

The

The legal description
trial

in the

the statute 0f frauds.

Tricore

PSA

did not comply with the statute offrauds.

court incorrectly concluded that the Tricore

frauds despite the fact that

it

PSA

complied with the

statute

of

does not precisely describe the “not less than 200 feet 0f waterfront”

be retained by the Estate. R. 2005. Tricore argues that the legal description

to

deﬁnite” on the face of the Tricore

PSA

Russell,

“sufﬁciently

because the agreement only need show the

intent” 0f the parties with respect t0 a particular piece ofproperty

v.

is

and nothing more,

“common

citing Russell

99 Idaho 151, 578 P.2d 1082 (1978). Russell does not apply for three reasons.

First, the earnest

money agreement

in Russell speciﬁcally incorporated the full legal

description of the property as follows: “Full legal attached 0f Howard Russell Property located

Beacon Road, Emmett, Idaho consisting 0f approx. 200

acres.” Id. at 152,

separate paper with the full legal description had been prepared and

the agreement. Id. at 153-154, 578 P.2d at 1084-1085.

578 P.2d

was kept

The Court held

that

“side

it

at

by

1082.

0n

A

side” with

would be “pure

semantics” t0 conclude that the contract violated the statute 0f frauds because the legal description

was not physically attached t0

the earnest

description of the “not less than

200

money agreement. Id. That is not the case here. N0

feet

drafted, let alone attached to the Tricore

legal

0f waterfront” t0 be retained by the Estate was ever

PSA. EX. 2 1 3 (COE 344

at

1]

5).

Tricore conceded that the

dimensions of this property were uncertain and never determined and could be more than 200
R. 588-89 (Mort). This does not meet the statute 0f frauds.

Ray

v.

feetl.

Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 629,

200 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009).
Second, the Court in Russell noted that

it

was undisputed

that there

was no confusion

regarding the boundaries 0r location 0f the property being sold. Russell, 99 Idaho at 153, 578 P.2d

1

Regarding

this uncertainty, Tricore asserts that

because the Estate drafted the PSA, any interpretation must be

construed against the Estate and in favor 0f Tricore. Respondent’s Brief, pg. 14.
testiﬁed that he added phrases to modify the Tricore
17.

As

PSA to

T0

the contrary, Tricore’s attorney

address Tricore’s concerns. R. 1100,
such, any “interpretation against the drafter” arguments don’t apply to this case.

1n.

6 to 1101,

1n.

at

1084. Here, there

Nobody knew

was n0

certainty as to the boundaries or location of the property t0

the length 0f the beachfront, the length 0f the opposite boundary

how the parcels would be

be

sold.

on the roadway,

conﬁgured, 0r whether the property reserved would be one

lot 0r

two.

It

was pure guesswork.
Third, Tricore’s reliance

0n the concurring opinion

complies With the statute of frauds
piece ofproperty

recognized

is

that: (1)

no reference

to

if

it

evidences the

any external or

is

and perfect a description

that

was

intent” 0f the parties regarding a

fact, the

concurring opinion correctly

defective When, unlike the case before the Court, there

extrinsic description

determined; and (2) external parol evidence

the Tricore

“common

misplaced. That is not the law in Idaho. In
a legal description

in Russell that a legal description

that is insufﬁcient

is

0n

from which a complete description could be

When

inadmissible

its

is

face. Id. at 155,

used t0 supply, complete,

it is

578 P.2d

at

1086. In this case,

PSA does not provide any legal description 0fthe “not less than 200 feet ofwaterfront”

t0

be reserved and retained by the Estate — and by necessary implication, the exact

boundaries of the land to be acquired by Tricore are imprecise. The
dispositive defect, erred

by concluding

that the Tricore

PSA

trial

court ignored this

complied With the

statute

0f frauds,

and must be reversed.
2.

The parties did not “mutually acknowledge
the agreement from the statute offrauds.

Tricore cites Kelly

v.

the Tricore

Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 811 P.2d 48

proposition that the statute 0f frauds

to exist but is not fully

”

is

inapplicable

performed by both

sides.

when

a contract

is

PSA

0r otherwise remove

(Ct.

App. 1991) for the

“mutually acknowledged”

Respondent ’s Brieﬁ pg.

12.

Kelly does not apply.

Kelly did not involve a sale of land with an insufﬁcient legal description. Instead, the Kelly

trial

court ruled that because the agreement

of frauds.

Id. at

had not been signed by the buyer,

it

violated the statute

874, 811 P.2d at 50. This Court reversed, noting that because both parties had

speciﬁcally alleged and agreed in their pleadings that an agreement actually existed,

to

conclude the agreement violated the statute of frauds for lack of signature.”

it

“was

error

Id.

Kelly does not apply because Tricore and the Estate have not acknowledged the existence

of an enforceable agreement as t0 the legal description 0f the property t0 be retained by the Estate.
Tricore argues that the Estate “acknowledged” the agreement based 0n a statement

representative,

Dan Warren,

that

“As

far as

we knew,

that the

by the personal

whole thing was going

to

g0

R 290. Mr. Warren made n0 admission rising t0 the level

eventually” Respondent ’s Brief pg. 14;

0f an “acknowledgement” referenced in Kelly, and Tricore has misrepresented the context 0f Mr.

Warren’s testimony. Mr. Warren made
efforts to enforce the Tricore

R 444-445.
2

“it

this

statement in response t0 a question about Tricore’s

PSA after the property was sold t0 Mr.

In addition, Tricore omits Mr. Warren’s testimony

had been a

lot

0f months and a

lot

contract with anybody.” Tr. 85 :20-86z3.

Stockton and Mr. Brinkmeyer.

where he

stated that

0f yays and nays. Ihad n0 idea for sure

by September

if I still

was

in a

Read in its proper context, Mr. Warren’s testimony cannot

be construed as an acknowledgement ofthe existence of an enforceable agreement as to the precise
legal description of the property t0

be retained by the Estate.

Tricore argues that because the Estate never claimed the legal description

before litigation, this
fails for at least

somehow removes

two reasons.

First,

was deﬁcient

the requirements 0f the statute 0f frauds. This argument

Tricore cites n0 authority to support that position

— because

none

exists.

Second, the statute 0f frauds

litigation is ﬁled. I.R.C.P. 8(c)(1);

(1999).

The Appellants complied,
Reference

3.

t0 the

Rowley

is

an afﬁrmative defense that must be asserted once

v.

Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 108, 982 P.2d 940, 943

asserting the statute of frauds as an afﬁrmative defense.

general quantity and identity 0f property does not

satisfi/

the

statute OZ frauds.

Tricore next contends that because the Tricore

PSA contains the “full legal” description 0f

the property, the general quantity, identity, 0r boundaries 0f the property can be determined from

the face of the instrument and meets the statute 0f frauds, relying

Mountain

Interests,

0n City ofKellogg

v.

Mission

Ltd, Ca, 135 Idaho 239, 16 P.3d 915 (2000). That case also does not apply.

Unlike the Tricore PSA, the agreement in City ofKellogg did not exclude a portion 0f land

from the

sale. Instead, the

property described in the agreement in City ofKellogg consisted 0f “the

lodge and the land upon which

it is

located, along with the ski

lift.” Id. at

244, 16 P.3d at 920

(emphasis added). The Court upheld the agreement because there was n0 evidence that the parties

were uncertain or confused about the property t0 be conveyed by the agreement: each knew exactly

Where the lodge and

The Court

ski

lift

were located and the land beneath them.

in Lexington Heights distinguished City

agreement provided that

was n0 confusion

as to

all the

land under

Id. at

245, 16 P.3d at 921.

ofKellogg because the terms of the written

known speciﬁc

structures

was being conveyed, s0

What was being conveyed. Lexington Heights Dev.,

LLC v.

there

Crandlemire,

140 Idaho 276, 285, 92 P.3d 526, 535 (2004). Conversely, the agreements in Lexington Heights
(and this case) are not sufﬁcient because neither identify the amount of land t0 be excluded from
the sale With any speciﬁcity. Id. at 281-282, 92 P.3d at 531-532. In Lexington Heights, the Court

stated that the focus 0f the statute 0f frauds

Whether the agreement
532.

is

is

not whether the parties reached an agreement, but

memorandum.

adequately reﬂected in the written

By operation of the parol evidence rule,

description contained in the written

a Court

is

Id. at

282, 92 P.3d

at

prohibited from going outside the property

memorandum and supplying

a description that

may have been

omitted from the writing. The David and Marvel Benton Trust

v.

McCarty, 161 Idaho 145, 151,

628-629, 200 P.3d

at

1177-1 178.

384 P.3d 392, 398 (2016); Ray, 146 Idaho

While the Tricore
frauds because

in the

by

it

agreement

PSA

at

generally describes Parcel A, B, and C,

it

violates the statute of

did not sufﬁciently describe the exact property t0 be sold Where there
itselfto sufﬁciently describe “not less than

the Estate. EX. 213

(COE

200

feet

is

nothing

0f waterfront” to be retained

342-344). Despite their attempt t0 d0 so, the

trial

court and Tricore

cannot ignore a contract provision that imprecisely describes real property. The entire agreement,
including

Addendum N0.

2,

must be reviewed

t0

conﬁrm

that

description 0f the property being conveyed. Burns Concrete, Inc.

v.

it

contains the precise legal

Teton County, 161 Idaho 117,

120, 384 P.3d 364, 367 (2016). Tricore has always candidly conceded (and the evidence at
established) that the dimensions 0f the “not less than

determined, and could be more than 200
Estate’s opening brief at page 23

feet.

200

feet

trial

0f waterfront” were uncertain, never

R. 588-589 (Mort). In addition, as set forth in the

and footnote

11, the

western and eastern boundaries of the

property were never certain and could have been conﬁgured in a multitude 0f shapes and sizes.

The

quantity, identity, or boundaries of the property

4.

were never determined.

The Tricore PSA was not a development agreement, and the bankruptcy cases cited
by Tricore d0 not apply t0 this case.

Tricore tries t0 skirt the statute 0f frauds

by

asserting that the Tricore

PSA was

really a

“hybrid development agreement,” a conclusion the
create three separate

and

distinct

trial

court never reached. Tricore attempts to

agreements out 0f one: a property transfer, an obligation to

provide a “service” of developing a

lot (0r

two

lots)

0f uncertain size for the Estate, and then a

property transfer back t0 the Estate. Respondent Tricore ’s Brief pg. 15 and 17. Tricore champions
this trifurcated contract

Ricks,

hypothesis t0 try t0 ﬁt Within the holdings 0f two Bankruptcy cases, In re

433 B.R. 806 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010), and In Re Old Cutters, 488 B.R. 130 (Bankr. D. Idaho

2012). This should be disregarded for ﬁve reasons.

First,

a federal court’s interpretations 0f Idaho law have n0 precedential authority in the

Idaho Supreme Court. Castorena

v.

General Elea, 149 Idaho 609, 620, 238 P.3d 209, 220 (2010).

Second, the Federal Bankruptcy Court will only endeavor t0 “predict”
court

would decide an

issue

when that law is

state’s highest court. In re Sterling

there

is

n0 reason

“unsettled” 0r has not been directly addressed

to resort to Federal

point. See, e.g.,

Ray

v.

by

the

Min. C0., 415 B.R. 762, 767-768 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). But

Bankruptcy Court opinions

Idaho Court would rule because Idaho law on the statute of frauds

0n

how the highest state

to attempt to predict

is

not only settled,

Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009); Hilbert

Idaho 203, 969 P.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1998); Lexington Heights Dev.,

LLC v.

v.

it is

how

an

directly

Hough, 132

Crandlemire, 140 Idaho

276, 92 P.3d 536 (2004).
Third, Ricks and

Old Cutters

are both distinguishable. In both cases, the contracts legally

described the real property sold in those agreements With precision. In re Ricks, 433 B.R. at 81
In re

Old

Cutters,

488 B.R.

at 142.

The only uncertainty was where

the individual lot lines

be drawn within the boundaries as the property was developed. In re Ricks, 433 B.R.

at

1;

would

820; In re

Old Cutters, 488 B.R.

at 142.

Both courts held that the

the land subject t0 each agreement

individual lots lines

may be drawn

statute

0f frauds was not implicated because

was speciﬁcally provided and

it

did not matter Where the

within that precise legal description. In re Ricks, 433 B.R. at

820-821; In re Old Cutters, 488 B.R.

at

142. Finally, the Court in Ricks, reasoned that the

agreement would not Violate the pronouncement in Lexington Heights because neither party
reserved a portion of the property within the precise boundaries from the sale and, as such, no
further discussions

be. In re Ricks,

were necessary t0 determine the

433 B.R.

unknown and undescribed

at

legal description of What this reservation

821. Similarly, the agreement in

might

Old Cutters did not exempt any

portion of the entire property precisely described from application of

that agreement.

Unlike the agreement in Ricks and Old Cutters, the Tricore

PSA was

not limited t0 a sale

0f an entire parcel of property legally described with pinpoint accuracy. The Estate was retaining
an undeﬁned portion 0f land that was never described With any

and Old Cutters are entirely inapposite. Tricore

is

certainty. In that regard,

either arguing that (1)

it

both Ricks

was buying property

except for “not less than 200 feet 0f waterfront” which was never legally described with pinpoint
accuracy, or (2)

it

was buying

all

0f the property and would transfer “not

waterfront” back t0 the Estate in the future.

statute

0f frauds and

it is

Under

the ﬁrst scenario, the Tricore

not enforceable. Under the second scenario,

frauds and, as discussed below, there

less than

it

200

feet

0f

PSA violates the

violates the statute 0f

was no meeting 0f the minds on material terms — the amount

of property being sold and whether title would always remain with the Estate 0r transfer t0 Tricore

and then be transferred back. In

either case, the Tricore

PSA is unenforceable

and the decision 0f

the

trial

court must be reversed.

Whether Stockton’s Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement contained a

5.

provision reserving real property

is irrelevant.

Tricore argues that because Stockton’s Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (the

Stockton

PSA)

also “retained

and reserved” a portion 0f land, and because

the imprecise legal description

must be good enough. Tricore continues

cannot claim that that the Tricore

PSA was “legally deﬁcient”

that transaction closed,

that the Estate therefore

in Violation

0f the

statute

0f frauds.

Respondent’s Brieﬁ pg. 13. This argument ignores Idaho law.

A contract that does not comply With the statute 0f frauds is not void but is “voidable” at
the election ofthe party against

C0,, 155 Idaho 538, 551,

whom enforcement is sought. Silicon Intern Ore, LLC v. Monsanto

314 P.3d 593, 606 (2013)

Citing Slusser

59 P.2d 723, 724 (1936) and 3 Williston 0n Contracts §7:13
not prevent a valid contract from being formed,

one party refuses

to perform.

Hoﬂman

v. S.

it

Under

settled

v.

(4th ed.).

The

statute

0f frauds does

V Ca,

if

Ina, 102 Idaho 187, 189, 628 P.2d 218, 220

is

formed, and the statute of frauds

is

not

Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1008-1009, 729 P.2d 1068, 1071-1072 (1986).

Idaho law, the Tricore

unenforceable

if

one party failed

cannot enforce

it

against the Estate.

6.

Aumock, 56 Idaho 793, 794,

only prevents contracts from being enforced

(1981). If both parties agree to perform, a valid contract
implicated. Frantz

v.

PSA

and the Stockton

t0 perform.

PSA

were not void, but they were

Because the Tricore

The Stockton PSA was

PSA was

voidable, Tricore

also voidable but the parties performed.

Lexington Heights controls the statute offrauds analysis.

To avoid Lexington Heights,

Tricore summarily concludes that

it

doesn’t apply because the

agreement in that case was not a “hybrid” purchase 0f land and services contract. Tricore

10

continues, Without citation t0 any evidence in the record, that the property t0 be reserved and
retained

by

the Estate

(0r two parcels)”

was

“tied t0

development standards” and “the service 0f developing a parcel

Respondent ’s Brieﬁ pg. 17-18. For the reasons

assertions should be disregarded. Lexington Heights

standing Idaho law.

The

frauds because there

is

less than

200

feet

is

directly

0n point and

legal description contained in the Tricore

no way

t0 determine the size, dimensions,

0f waterfront” to be excluded from the

278, 92 P.3d at 528. The

set forth above, these

sale.

PSA

unsupported

dispositive, as

is

long-

violates the statute 0f

and conﬁguration 0f the “not

Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho

at

be reconciled With clear Idaho law

trial

court’s contrary ruling cannot

fails

because there was n0 meeting of the minds.

and must be reversed.

The Tricore PSA

C.

1.

The trial court erred by applying the wrong legal analysis t0 its unchallenged
ﬁndings that there was n0 meeting offhe minds regarding a 318—f00t section 0f
water rant.

Tricore summarily concludes that there were n0 facts to support a lack 0f the meeting 0f

the

minds regarding whether

the Tricore

3

1

8 feet

of valuable waterfront property was or was not included in

PSA. Respondent’s Brieﬁ

pg. 10.

T0

the contrary, the trial court’s unchallenged

ﬁndings 0f fact established that there was no meeting 0f the minds regarding whether that 3 1 8
0f waterfront was 0r was not included in the Tricore PSA. The
the correct law, a mistake echoed

The

trial

court

made

by Tricore 0n

The

owns

court simply failed t0 apply

appeal.

the following unchallenged ﬁndings of fact that establish that there

was n0 meeting of the minds Whether the
0

trial

feet

3 1 8 feet 0f waterfront

was included

in the Tricore

PSA:

between the east boundary 0f
the 65 acres and the westernmost Warren Beach Lot. The 318 feet is illustrated on the
Estate

3

1

8 feet 0f undeveloped waterfront located

11

diagram below as the portion of waterfront between numerals “3” and “2”. Mr. Mort
mistakenly believed he had contracted to purchase the waterfront between numerals “1”
and “2”; When in actuality, the Warren -Tricore PSA encompasses only the waterfront
between “1” and “3”. R. 1998.
rm.
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J

knew

exactly what

was

o

It is

0

Mort was the only person Who was conﬁlsed, and that confusion was only as to
of waterfront adjacent t0 the Warren Beach Lots. the 318 feet of waterfront was
not included in the Tricore PSA. R. 2005-2006.

it

selling. R.

2005.

Clifford

318

o

undisputed that the Estate

feet

was a unilateral mistake by

At most,

this

The trial

court correctly framed the

issues: (l)

two

Tricore. R. 2006.

legal issues

and cited the correct law for those legal

“Formation of a valid contract requires a meeting of the minds on

Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 5 12, 211 P.3d 118, 121 (2009); Barry

v.

all

material terms,

Pacific West C0nstr., Ina,

140 Idaho 827, 83 1, 103 P.3d 440, 444 (2004).”; and (2) “The amount of land included in a real
estate purchase

and

P.2d 202, 205

946).” R. 2005-06. However, the

(1

sale

agreement

is

a material term. Brothers

trial

v.

Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 176, 174

court applied the

wrong

legal analysis

Which

Tricore parrots on appeal: (1) Tricore’s mistake regarding the 3 1 8 feet of waterfront constituted a
“unilateral” mistake that did not authorize the Estate to rescind the Tricore

no “mutual mistake”

to invalidate the agreement. R.

12

2006.

PSA; and

(2) there

was

But the Estate did not argue

“unilateral mistake” 0r “mutual mistake” t0 invalidate the

Tricore PSA.2 Instead, the Estate argued that because there
material term 0f the contract, no contract

Seward

v.

Tricore had the burden t0 prove that there

Inc.

v.

Konic

Loucks Family Irrevocable
Int’l

Corp.

v.

Tricore did not meet

Spokane
its

an understanding

Musick Auction, LLC, 164 Idaho

material terms, including as t0 What land

Trust,

Svcs., Ina,

was a

149, 159,

“distinct

was included within

and

common to

feet

minds 0n a

both parties as

426 P.3d 1249, 1259 (2018).

common

understanding” 0n

all

the legal description. P. 0. Ventures,

144 Idaho 233, 238, 159 P.3d 870, 875 (2007); See also
109 Idaho 527, 529, 708 P.2d 932, 934

burden because the

trial

(Ct.

App. 1985).

court entered ﬁndings 0f fact that Tricore and the

Estate attributed materially different meanings t0 a material term in the Tricore

whether 318

the

was ever formed. R. 1798-1802.

A contract can only be formed When there is
t0 its terms.

was n0 meeting 0f

PSA, speciﬁcally

of valuable waterfront was included or excluded. See Hill—Schafer P’ship

v.

Chilson Family Trust, 165 Ariz. 469, 472, 799 P.2d 810, 814 (Ariz. 1990) (“Ifone party thinks he

is

buying one thing and the otherparly thinks he

occurs,

and n0 contract isformed.”) (applying
The

is

trial

court ruled that the

selling another thing,

n0 meeting 0fthe minds

the Restatement (Second) 0f Contracts §20(1)).

amount 0f land

in a real estate purchase

and

sale

agreement

a material term, R. 2005 citing Brothers, supra, a point the parties did not dispute. Tricore

conceded that whether the 318
difference 0f opinion, that

2

is

As

it

feet

was a

of waterfront was 0r was not included was a fundamental

crucial part

0f its planned development, that

v.

was imperative

its opening brief (at p. 29, fn. 13), a unilateral mistake analysis does not apply. See,
Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639-640, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102-03 (Ct. App. 1983).

Appellants explained in

generally Bailey

it

13

for Tricore to

own

it,

and

that

its

exclusion would cause a $2.2 million loss for Tricore. Tr.

(COE

1106:15-1 107: 17 (Lempesis); Tr. 222:3-22329, 22628-22, 229: 10-13 (Mort); EX. 224

366-

367); Tr. 106621 1-1067:7 (Lempesis); Tr. 838:18-22 (Finney); Tr. 445:17-23, 446217-23 (Mullen).

The

trial

Idaho

at

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact are unchallenged, are therefore binding

on appeal, Lockridge, 93

was no

304, 460 P.2d at 729, and lead to only one conclusion under Idaho law: there

meeting of the minds on

this material contract term,

no contract was formed, and the

trial

court

must be reversed.
Tricore attempts t0 brush off the testimony and evidence at

trial

— and

the

trial

court’s

unchallenged ﬁndings of fact — by arguing that the mistake was simply an opportunity to try and
negotiate modiﬁcations or price terms. Respondent’s Brieﬁ pg. 19.

opening brief

at

whether the 3 1 8

pages 9-12, that
feet

is

exactly the point.

The

parties

As

detailed in Appellant’s

were continuing

0f waterfront was or was not included, and they never reached a

common understanding

t0 negotiate

distinct

and

as t0 material terms 0f the contract.

Tricore then cites Liebelt

v.

Liebelt,

118 Idaho 845, 801 P.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1990) for the

proposition that a party cannot avoid a contract because he failed t0 read and understand.

That

case dealt with the Defendant’s attempt t0 void a prenuptial agreement based 0n duress, undue

inﬂuence, and because she alone did not understand the legal signiﬁcance of that agreement.
Liebelt,

m

118 Idaho

parties

formation.

had a

at 848,

distinct

801 P.2d

and

at 55.

common

The overwhelming evidence

issue establish that Tricore

The

distinguishable legal issue in this case

is

whether

understanding of the material terms of the contract

at trial

and the Estate did

and the

not.

14

trial

court’s unchallenged ﬁndings

on

at

this

Tricore then pivots and argues that

it

was

ready, willing, and able t0 complete the purchase

based 0n the existing written description. Respondent ’s Brief pg.
issue

19. Tricore

whether a legally enforceable contract was ever formed, not the performance of that

is

contract.

“Proof 0f a meeting 0f the minds requires evidence 0f mutual understanding as

terms 0f the agreement and the assent 0f both parties.” Potts Const. C0.

Idaho 678, 681, 116 P.3d

District, 141

at

529, 708 P.2d at 934.

(When both

was n0 meeting 0f the minds and n0
that

it

8,

is

v.

t0 the

N. Kootenai Water

11 (2005) (emphasis added). See also Konic, 109 Idaho

meanings

parties attributed different

contract

was ever formed.)

would have performed and purchased

description”

to the

there

0n the “existing written

not the issue.3 The parties needed a meeting 0f the minds on

trial

same term,

Tricore’s after—the-fact insistence

the property based

a valid contract t0 be formed. The evidence and the

this

misses the point. The

all

material terms for

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact demonstrate that

never occurred, and a valid contract was never formed.

There was n0 meeting offhe minds 0n whether

2.

title t0

the “not less than

200 feet 0f

waterfront” retained by the Estate would ever transfer t0 Tricore.

There

is

and the Estate
less than

200

to Tricore

a second material issue that prevented a meeting of the minds in this case: Tricore

failed t0 reach a distinct

feet

and

about whether

title

t0 the “not

0f waterfront” would always remain vested in the Estate, 0r would be transferred

and then transferred back.

3

In any event, Tricore’s belated concession that

3

1

8 feet 0f waterfront

was not made

(COE 221),

(COE

Ex. 53

common understanding

EX. 54

it

was “ready,

until after the transaction

222).

As

such, there

Willing and able” to perform Without inclusion 0f the

With Stockton and Brinkmeyer closed. R. 2004-2005;

was never a

distinct

and

term, and therefore no meeting 0f the minds, at any time before the property

15

common understanding on that material

was

sold to Stockton and Brinkmeyer.

Tricore argues that “Mr. Finney’s subjective interpretation

Brieﬁ pg. 20. Tricore’s attempt t0 portray

would be implemented misses

200

this as a subjective interpretation

on how the contract

The

understanding on a material contract term
the “not less than

PSA.” Respondent’s

the fundamental point:

understanding 0n contract formation.

feet

— whether

getting

it

200

The

parties never reached a

the Estate

would

retain or relinquish title to

0f waterfront.” The Estate was acutely aware 0f the perils 0f a “transfer

feet

t0 retain

title,

and would never have transferred

0f waterfront” t0 Tricore in order t0 avoid putting

back. Tr. 815:20-816zl3 (Finney). Tricore understood

than 200 feet of waterfront” and transfer

it

back

later.

it

would take

itself at risk

title

minds on

67 Idaho

that term,

at 176,

no contract was formed and the

174 P.2d

at

trial

205; P.O. Ventures, 144 Idaho

court

feet

to the “not less

at

was no meeting of

238, 153 P.3d at 875.5

of lakefront in the form of one

(1) or

“The contract

two

(2) lots

certainty

compliant

With Bonner County Planning and Zoning requirements.” Respondent’s Brief pg. 20. The

4

This assertion

5

Tricore’s reliance 0n General Auto Parts, C0., Inc.

is

incorrect.

Both Tricore and the Estate drafted
v.

this provision in the Tricore

Genuine Parts

is

must be reversed. See Brothers,

In a further attempt t0 avoid this pitfall, Tricore mistakenly argues,

was Warrens would receive 200

0f not

Since the amount 0f land t0 be conveyed

a material term in any real estate purchase and sale agreement, and since there
the

mutual

common

never reached a distinct and

parties

and transfer back” arrangement, always intended
the “not less than

‘carve-

the enforceability 0f the

by him)4, has n0 bearing 0n

out’ language (drafted

ofhow t0 implement the

C0.,

PSA. See footnote

trial

1.

132 Idaho 849, 979 P.2d 1207 (1999)

is

misplaced because that case requires obj ective manifestations on the material term of the description of the property
to be sold. The Estate agrees. The Tricore PSA lacks a legal description 0f the “not less than 200 feet 0f waterfront.”

16

court

made

the

same mistake by erroneously ﬁnding,

“It is

undisputed that both sides mutually

agreed that the Estate would retain 200 feet 0f lakefront from Parcel
concluding, “Whether the 200 feet

lots

were platted does not

was carved out 0f the deed

A” and

at closing 0r

then incorrectly

deeded back

0f their Agreement.” R. 2007. T0 the contrary and as

alter the validity

discussed above, the amount ofreal property at issue was anything but a certainty. The
position that because the parties had a general idea of the end result,

it

diametrically opposed positions 0f the parties

Perhaps more problematic for Tricore

conceded

less than

that the exact

determined, that

it

200

feet

is

the lack of any meeting of the

real property t0 retained

was uncertain how much frontage would be

border on the roadway could be more

g

less than

was no meeting 0f the minds on a material

court’s

it

ignored the

0n a material term.
minds regarding

0f waterfront” actually encompassed. At

dimension 0f the

trial

did not matter Whether the

property was t0 be retained 0r transferred and transferred back was error because

what area the “not

after the

200

feet.

by

retained,

trial,

was never

the Estate

and

R. 588-589 (Mort).

Tricore

that the opposite

Once

again, there

contract term.

Tricore cites a single sentence from

Dan Warren’s

trial

testimony and language from the

Indemniﬁcation Agreement t0 try t0 resuscitate the Tricore PSA. Mr. Warren’s vague statement

is

taken out 0f context, the Indemniﬁcation Agreement only states what the Estate told third parties,

and neither can ﬁx the Tricore PSA’S
0f “not

less than

waterfront

200

feet

was included

fatal

ﬂaws. Neither revise the insufﬁcient legal description

0f waterfront.” Neither resolve the dispute over whether 318 feet 0f

in the Tricore

PSA. Neither resolve

the dispute over whether

title

t0 the

“not less than 200 feet 0f waterfront” would always remain vested with the Estate 0r would be
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and then transferred back t0 the

transferred t0 Tricore

rendered the Tricore

Estate.

Those

fatal

ﬂaws remained, and they

PSA unenforceable which is dispositive 0f Tricore’s

claims.

Tricore repudiated the Tricore PSA.

D.

The evidence at

I.

The

trial

court erred

by refusing

the trial court found that that

Tricore might

fail t0

trial established

it

perform

to

repudiation by Tricore.

ﬁnd that

Tricore repudiated the Tricore

heard “hours” 0f testimony from Mr. Finney that he believed

at closing,

erroneously concluded that

it

“it

testimony 0r receive any documents t0 support a ﬁnding that Tricore ever
statement or declaration” that
court’s ﬁndings 0f fact

0n

it

this issue

(1 955).

demonstrate that

The focus

performance. Liebelt, 118 Idaho

the Estate believed,

trial

it

made any

positive

is

at 849,

court’s

the

trial

failed t0 properly apply the law.

express 0r implied. Jensen

v.

Chandler, 77 Idaho 303, 307,

whether a party’s words 0r actions are inconsistent with

existence of a contract and, if so, the other party

P.2d 198, 200 (1983). The

did not hear any

would not perform. R. 2008. (emphasis added). However,

A party’s repudiation can be
291 P.2d 1116, 1118

PSA. Although

801 P.2d

may

at 56;

own ﬁndings

by Tricore’s own words or

treat the contract as

Foley

v.

Munio, 105 Idaho 309, 31

0f fact and evidence

actions, that

it

ended for further
1,

669

at trial established that

had repudiated the

contract.

In addition t0 the acts 0f repudiation discussed in Appellants’ opening brief (at p. 32), the

trial

court’s ﬁndings noted that

the agreement, there

mind
Estate

were three

when

Tricore realized that 318 of waterfront

possibilities

from

and, therefore, n0 deal; (2) the parties

would have

t0 include

its

perspective: “(1) there

would have

more waterfront property
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t0 agree

was not included

in

was no meeting 0f the

0n a reduced

in the sale.” R. 1999.

price; or (3) the

Mr. Finney testiﬁed

that Tricore’s attorney stated that “the only

way

would g0 forward would be

the matter

reduction in price 0r additional footage 0r other concessions” and that there

mind

that Tricore

had repudiated.

either a

was no doubt

in his

8725-87323, 87724-87828, 1577:3-

Tr. 829:8-21, 83324-10,

157825 (Finney).6

The
With

its

its

trial

court’s conclusion 0f law that there

own ﬁndings of fact and

testimony

was no evidence 0f repudiation

at trial. Tricore

repudiated the Tricore

words and actions and how those words and actions were interpreted by the

repudiated the Tricore

2.

The Estate

by Tricore

as a defense because the Closing 0f the Tricore

Hinkle merely provides that

must be able

t0

if

v.

on

Estate. Tricore

show

it

was ready
Id. at

to

perform

its

(i.e.,

own

997-998, 895 P.2d

could not raise

PSA would

not have

at

Tricore), the other party

obligations if

repudiates a contract, the other party has two options:

1,

deem

669 P.2d

at

it

(i.e.,

intends to seek

598-599. Hinkle does not apply

because the Estate did not seek speciﬁc performance as a remedy in

enforce the contract. Foley, 105 Idaho at 31

it

Winey, 126 Idaho 993, 895 P.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1995).

one party repudiates a contract

speciﬁc performance as a remedy.

6

PSA based

not barred from arguing repudiation.

is

occurred until after that date, citing Hinkle

the Estate)

inconsistent

PSA and the trial court must be reversed.

Tricore argues that because the Estate sold the property 0n September 6,
repudiation

is

this case.

When

a party

the contract terminated or attempt to

200.

Co-Personal Representative Chris Warren also testiﬁed that he also understood Tricore had repudiated. See Tr.
(“I don’t—I thought that the Tricore deal was done. That’s Why we sold to Mr. Stockton.”); Tr. 494: 12-16

473:14-18
(“Q:
I

What were the

didn’t think

other reasons

we had

by you were comfortable

in selling

a deal With Tricore.”)
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it

Mr. Stockton and Mr. Brinkmeyer? A: Because

United California Bank v. Prudential Ins. C0. ofAmerica, 140 Ariz. 238, 681 P.2d 390 (Ct.

App. 1983), cited by Tricore, also does not apply. United provides

that in a repudiation case, the

non-breaching party need only show that he would have been ready and able to perform the

As

contract. Id. Again, Tricore confuses the record.

regarding the 3 1 8 feet 0f waterfront and

made

would not move forward. Mr. Finney testiﬁed
the

sale

it

that

Stockton and Brinkmeyer. R. 2004-2005;

3.

EX

m

53

PSA,

it

he understood there was n0 contract and that

new

would be Willing

without the 318 feet 0f waterfront) until

demanded concessions

Clear that Without changes to the Tricore

of property would only g0 through with

Furthermore, Tricore never indicated

(i.e.,

it

set forth above, Tricore

t0

terms.

perform the Tricore

the property

(COE

Repudiation does not require a writing

PSA

as written

had already been transferred

221); EX. 54

t0

841 :1-842z3. (Finney).

Tr.

(COE

comply with the

t0

222).

statute offrauds.

Tricore argues that the existence 0f a purchase and sale agreement creates an “interest” in

property and, because

it

held an alleged interest in real property, the statute 0f frauds requires

repudiation to be in writing to eliminate that interest. This

First,

Doe v. Doe,

incorrect.

Tricore never raised this issue below and cannot raise

it

for the ﬁrst time

on appeal.

160 Idaho 854, 860, 380 P.3d 175, 181 (2016).

Second, on
that

is

conveyance

its

is in

face, the statute

writing.

of frauds prohibits the conveyance 0f real property unless

LC. §9-503. Repudiation of a contract, (which can be express 0r

implied) depends 0n whether a party’s words 0r actions are inconsistent With the existence of a

contract. Jensen,

77 Idaho

at

307, 291 P.2d at 1118; Liebelt, 118 Idaho at 849, 801 P.2d at 56.

Based 0n those “words 0r actions” the other party may
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treat the contract as

ended as

far as further

performance. Foley, 105 Idaho

There
there

is

is

at 3

1 1,

669 P.2d

at

n0 authority that requires repudiation t0 be

200; Restatement (Second) 0f Contracts §250.
in writing Within the statute

0f frauds, because

n0 conveyance 0f property.
Third, there

is

n0 authority

that the existence

“interest” in real property requiring

of a purchase and sale agreement creates an

compliance with the

statute

of frauds. Tricore

from Utah and Georgia that do not support the proposition and that don’t apply t0

relies

0n cases

this case. Tricore

attempts t0 avail itself ofthe concept 0f “equitable conversion” discussed in these cases as creating

an “ownership interest” in real property.
is

When

applicable, the doctrine 0f “equitable conversion”

properly utilized t0 protect a buyer’s interest in land from the seller’s creditors

becomes capable 0f speciﬁc enforcement by the buyer.
Corporation, 2107

UT

417 P.3d 70 (2017). The

90,

SMS Financial, LLC

SMS Financial

seller

had already agreed to

that the concept

sell

under a contract.

Id. at

v.

CBC Financial

Court simply held that the

application 0f the doctrine precluded a seller’s creditor from attaching a

Which the

when that contract

judgment

lien t0 land

73-74. That case does not provide

0f “equitable conversion” creates a property interest in land which requires

compliance With the
Southeastern

statute

0f frauds as Tricore suggests.

Land Fund,

Inc.

v.

Real Estate World, Ina, 237 Ga. 227, 227 S.E.2d 340

(1976) does not apply either. That case addressed whether a contract provision for the payment of
earnest

money should be

considered a contract term for liquidated damages

when

the buyer

breaches. Id. at 228-229, 227 S.E.2d at 342-343. That case does not hold that the purchase and sale

agreement, standing alone, creates an “interest” in real property as Tricore suggests.
Tricore’s reliance

0n Mueller v.

Hill,

158 Idaho 208, 345 P.3d 998 (2015)
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is

also incorrect.

That case considered a trespass claim related to the Defendant’s blasting work in constructing a
driveway. Id. The Defendant claimed the Plaintiff was not entitled t0 damages t0 remove a tree

damaged by

the blast because he

was not

the

owner of the

time of the

real property at the

act.

The

Plaintiff

contended he was the “equitable owner” because 0f an oral agreement by his eX-wife t0

him

the property if he paid $120,000 Within one year of the divorce. Id. at 215, 345 P.3d at

sell

1005.

The Court held

that “equitable conversion” occurs

contract for the sale 0f real property: the buyer

is

the equitable

owner 0f the purchase price.

the equitable

is

Id.

When

See also Rush

the parties enter into a binding

owner 0f the property and the
v.

seller

Anestos, 104 Idaho 630, 634, 661

P.2d 1229, 1233 (1983) (The doctrine only operates to create a ﬁction that when a binding contract
exists for the purchase

the seller

is

0f real property, the purchaser

the “equitable”

owner 0f the purchase

is

the “equitable

price.)

owner” 0f the property and

The Court did not hold

created an “interest” in real property subject t0 the statute 0f frauds, nor does

that the doctrine

it

require repudiation

Inc,

871 S.W. 2d 929

of an agreement selling property to be in writing.
Tricore’s reliance

0n Collins

Allied

v.

(1994) and Petrohawk Properties, L.P.

v.

Pharmacy Management,

Jones, 455 S.W. 3d. 753 (TeX. App. 2015) are also

misplaced. Neither case provides that repudiation 0f a real estate contract must be in writing.
Tricore’s reliance

P.2d 386

(1

967)

0n First

Sec.

illustrates the limits

When a judgment

lien

was obtained

Bank ofldaho,

Nat. Ass’n

v.

Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429

0f the doctrine 0f “equitable conversion.” The Court held that
against the seller after

making a contract

to sell real property

but prior t0 making delivery 0f the deed, the doctrine 0f equitable conversion did not preclude

attachment 0f liens t0

all

0f the

seller’s

remaining interest in the land and binds the land t0 the
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extent 0f the unpaid purchase price. Id. at 657,

implicated here and there

real property

statute

must be

is

n0 requirement

in writing

429 P.2d

that repudiation

at

389. Equitable conversion

Tricore ’s

0f a contract for the conveyance 0f

and include a legal description of that property as required by the

demand for concessions demonstrates

Tricore argues that

Tricore

its

it

repudiated the Tricore PSA.

Willingness to negotiate performance different from the terms of the

PSA demonstrated its Willingness t0

abide by the contract and, therefore, did not result in

anticipatory breach citing Regional Enterprises, Inc.

v.

Teachers

& Annuity Ass ’n ofAmerica,

Ins.

was n0 repudiation because one

352 F.2d 768

(9th Cir.

party had not

made a statement that it would not or could not perform, and there were n0

0r intent t0 impose

1965). In that case, the court held that there

new and unreasonable

stated, Tricore

demanded concessions and threatened t0 not

Tricore then argues that if there

is

Lakes Land Acquisition,

v.

close. This case

its

interpretation is not, in

Federal Rubber C0., 85 F.2d 129, 131

if

does not apply.

LLC v. Town ofMammoth Lakes,

and of itself, anticipatory

(8th Cir.

191 Cal.App.

797 (2010). These out 0f state cases d0 not apply. Instead, they stand

n0 repudiation

issues. Id.

only a disagreement as to the meaning 0f contract terms,

one party’s offer t0 perform in accordance with
breach, citing Lowenstein

statements

conditions 0f performance. Id. at 775-776. Instead, the

communications were nothing more than an invitation for a discussion ofpotential legal

is

not

of frauds.
4.

As

is

4th

435, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d

its

if that interpretation is incorrect.

however, offer t0 perform according t0 a good

faith
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Mammoth

for the proposition that there

a party t0 a contract offers t0 perform according t0

understanding 0f the contract terms, even

1936) and

own “good

fait

”

Tricore did not,

understanding of the contract terms. After

it

conceded its mistake regarding 3 1 8

feet

and new terms and threatened not

t0 close.

0f waterfront,

The

it

demanded $880,000 worth 0f concessions

parties did not

have a good

faith difference

0f

opinion of a contract terms in this case.

The Estate was not limited

5.

t0 contract

remedies upon Tricore ’s repudiation.

Tricore asserts that n0 repudiation occurred because the Estate did not resort t0 contract

remedies by giving notice under the contract and retaining the earnest money. The Tricore
speciﬁed that upon default, the Estate had the option t0 retain earnest
remedies t0 Which

it

Tricore suggests. EX.

The

E.

trial

may be
1

(COE

entitled.

The Estate was

not,

money

PSA

or pursue other legal

however, limited t0 that remedy as

80).

court erred

when

it

held Stockton liable for tortious interference with a

contract.

There was n0 valid contract and, as a

1.

result,

Tricore cannot maintain an action for

tortious interference.

As

set forth

demonstrate that the
enforceable.

above, the facts presented at

trial

court erred

7

The

trial

when concluding

may have

LLC v.

t0 the clear

that the Tricore

law 0f Idaho

PSA was

valid and

Idaho Dep ’t ofAdmin, 155 Idaho 55, 64, 305 P.3d 499, 507

court’s ruling t0 the contrary

Tricore contends that even if there

Tricore

and applied

Without an enforceable contract, a claim for tortious interference cannot be

maintained. Syringa Networks,

(2013).

trial

was no

contract,

it

must be reversed.7

established tortious interference with a business expectancy.

alleged a claim for tortious interference with a business expectancy in

its

complaint, but the

trial

make any ﬁndings of fact 0r conclusions 0f law 0n this claim and it is improper for this court t0 d0 so
now. Pope v. Intermountain Gas C0., 103 Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982). In further support of this
court did not

argument, Stockton also incorporates Section I.D. 0f Brinkmeyer’s Reply Brief pursuant to I.A.R. 35(h).
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The

2.

If a right

right.

trial court’s

0f ﬁrst refusal

is valid,

Meridian Bowling Lanes,

1294, 1296 (1983); Gyurkey

v.

ﬁndings established Stockton

Inc.

v.

2000); Sines

v.

0f ﬁrst
right.

The

Meridian Athletic Ass ’n,

PSA. See

right,

trial

trial

trial

court

e.g. Crivelli v.

court erred

a preemptive

105 Idaho 504, 51

1,

General Motors Corp, 215 F.3d 386, 395

WL

1528236,

670 P.2d

(3rd Cir.

at *2.

by barring testimony regarding

court simply misapplied the law

made

Inc.

is

he could not intentionally or improperly interfere with

refusal, the trial court nonetheless entered

The

0

the holder’s right t0 purchase the property

Maddox, 122 Wn.App. 1023, 2004

Although the

right ofﬁrst refusal.

Babler, 103 Idaho 663, 666, 651 P.2d 928, 931 (1982). In this case,

once Stockton exercised his superior
or breach the Tricore

’s

the existence 0f a valid right

ﬁndings that established the existence 0f that

when it barred evidence of the right 0f ﬁrst refusal.

the following unchallenged ﬁndings:

In 1989, Stockton

was negotiating

to purchase lakefront

from the Warrens,

adj acent t0 the

Brinkmeyers’ property. R. 1994.

o

During the negotiations, Stockton agreed

Warrens
0

t0

move

his property line t0 the east to allow the

to sell additional lakefront property to the

In exchange for this concession, Bill and Elaine
right t0 purchase Priest

Brinkmeyers. R. 1994-1995.

Warren promised t0 give Stockton the

Lake property they offered

for sale. R. 1995.

o

Both Dan and Chris [Warren] were aware of their parents’ promise

o

Consistent with

Dan and Chris’

ﬁrst

t0 Stockton. R.

1995

understanding 0f their parents’ promise t0 Stockton, Finney

e-mailed Stockton prior to listing the property for sale to inquire whether he was interested
in purchasing

8

it.

R. 1995- 1 996.8

As the trial court found, this e-mail related only to “two parcels 0f Priest Lake real property, totaling about 45 acres.”
As further discussed in Section E.2.d. below, Stockton was never offered the 65 acres in the Tricore PSA.

R. 1995.
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Tricore did not assign error t0 these ﬁndings of fact Which are therefore binding 0n appeal.

Lockridge, 93 Idaho at 304, 460 P.2d at 729.

Reply

Brief, other admissible evidence

refusal. Despite its

As

referenced in Section B.2.d. 0f Brinkmeyer’s

conﬁrmed

the creation and validity 0f the right of ﬁrst

ﬁndings and the other admissible evidence, the

trial

court erred

evidence 0f the right of ﬁrst refusal because “under the deadman statute

.

.

.

when

there

is

it

barred

no way

Stockton could have asserted a claim for a right of ﬁrst refusal against the estate.” Tr. 21: 10-18
(10/26/ 1 8).

there

The

was n0

trial

court further erred

When it barred evidence of the right of ﬁrst refusal because

“legally enforceable right 0f ﬁrst refusal” pursuant to the statute 0f frauds and I.R.E

601. Tr. 21:10-23: 4 (10/26/18).

a.

The deadman ’s

statute,

I.R.E 601, and I.R.E. 801 d0 not apply.

Tricore provides n0 authority t0 repair the

trial

court’s errors in prohibiting testimony

regarding the right of ﬁrst refusal. Instead, Tricore cites the deadman’s statute, references I.R.E.

60 1 and simply argues “Appellants got exactly what they requested — the opportunity to argue the
,

right

0f ﬁrst refusal justiﬁed

That

is

their conspiracy t0 tortuously interfere.”

not the issue. The issue

is

evidence; speciﬁcally, Whether the

Whether the
trial

trial

court abused

Respondent’s Brieﬁ pg.

its

discretion in barring this

court acted within the outer boundaries of

and consistent with any applicable legal standards

to speciﬁc choices.

10.

Lunders

v.

its

discretion

Estate ofSnyder,

131 Idaho 689, 699, 963 P.2d 372, 382 (1998).

The

trial

court abused

the deadman’s statute.

legally unenforceable,

its

discretion because, despite

The deadman’s

it

statute

its

own ﬁndings,

it

incorrectly applied

does not render Stockton’s right of ﬁrst refusal

only “prohibit[s] a party making a claim against the estate from testifying
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as t0

at

any unwritten communications With the deceased.” Lunders, 131 Idaho

381-82. Accordingly,

and does not apply

it

if the party’s

1989).

Lowry

claim

v.

is

not against the estate. Argyle

against the Estate, but rather sought t0 introduce evidence of

of ﬁrst refusal t0 defend against a claim, the

but

also

sought

to

introduce

trial

court erred in prohibiting evidence of it.

P.2d 294, 299 (1973) (The statute

statute

and

is

may

—

concerning

testimony

communications about Stockton’s right of ﬁrst

interest in the estate

Slewmaker, 99 Idaho 544,

“does not apply t0 evidence used to defend

it

In addition, the party entitled to object t0 the testimony

object

v.

Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 711 fn.1, 779 P.2d 22, 25, fn.1 (Ct. App.

As Stockton made no claim

his right

698-99, 963 P.2d

“prohibits testimony introduced against the estate 0f a deceased person”

547-48, 585 P.2d 954, 957-58 (1978). Furthermore,
against a Claim.”

at

refusal.

See Smith

v.

the Estate

Bill

and

— not only
Elaine

failed t0

Warren’s

Smith, 95 Idaho 477, 482, 511

only be asserted by a representative or a party having an

not available to claimants against the

estate.).

does not render the offered evidence inadmissible, the

trial

Because the deadman’s
court erred in holding

otherwise9.

Stockton

b.

’s

right ofﬁrst refusal

was not subject

t0 the statute offrauds.

The trial court improperly concluded that because Stockton’s right of ﬁrst refusal was never
reduced to writing and there was n0 “legally enforceable right” t0 exercise against the Estate, that
as a result

trial

9

at trial.

R. 13 1 8; Tr. 21 19-25. Tricore echoes the
:

court’s misapplication 0f the law, arguing that since Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal

Since the

was

no evidence 0f it could be introduced

trial

court

in error, there is

was never

made ﬁndings substantiating the right of ﬁrst refusal and its ruling barring that evidence at trial
n0 need to address Tricore’s argument that the trial court properly excluded that evidence as

hearsay under I.R.E. 801.
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reduced t0 writing

it is

completely invalid, relying on Hoﬁ’man

v.

S V

C0., Ina,

102 Idaho 187,

628 P.2d 218 (1981). Tricore misapplies Hoﬂman.

A

right

of ﬁrst refusal operates as a preemptive

contractual right to purchase the property t0

which it is

right, vesting in the

subj ect.

holder a superior

Hancock v. Dusenberry, 110 Idaho

147, 151-52, 715 P.2d 360, 364-65 (Ct. App. 1986). Although a right 0f ﬁrst refusal

the statute of frauds, Idaho

an

Code

§

9-503, this Court has

made

formed;

at

it

subject t0

clear that oral contracts affecting

interest in real property are just as valid as written agreements.

628 P.2d

is

Hoﬁ’man, 102 Idaho

at

189-90,

220-211. The statute 0f frauds does not prevent such contracts from being validly

merely renders them unenforceable

Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A.

v.

if

one party refuses

Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 489

t0 perform.

f.1,

Treasure Valley

20 P.2d 21, 25,

fn.

1

(Ct.

App. 2001).
Thus,

When both

parties t0 an oral right 0f ﬁrst refusal

and the Estate did here, the
P.2d

at

statute

of frauds

is

perform as promised, as Stockton

not implicated. Frantz, 111 Idaho at 1008-09, 729

1071-1072. Tricore, as a stranger to the contract, did not have standing t0 contest

Mikesell

v.

Newworld Dev. Corp, 122 Idaho

it.

See

868, 874, 840 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Ct. App. 1992)

(holding that a non-party t0 oral agreement to convey land could not enforce statute of frauds

where neither party

to the oral

agreement denied

in barring testimony regarding Stockton’s right

A case cited by Tricore, Nicholson

v.

its

existence and validity).

0f ﬁrst

The

trial

court erred

refusal.

Coeur D ’Alene Placer Mining Corp, 161 Idaho 877,

392 P.3d 1218 (2017), conﬁrms the analysis above. In Nicholson, the Court did not conclude
an oral ﬁrst right 0f refusal was neverformed and therefore void from
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its

that

inception, but rather that

it

could not be speciﬁcally enforced.

882, 392 P.3d at 1223. Again, the statute 0f frauds

Id. at

—

inapplicable Where the parties mutually accept and perform the contract

PSA. Frantz, 111 Idaho

at

is

as With the Stockton

1008-09, 729 at 1071-72.

Here, the Estate agreed that there was a valid right of ﬁrst refusal, and the Estate fully

performed. EX. 8

(COE

106).

The

trial

court erred

by

ruling that the evidence

was not admissible

because Stockton could not legally enforce the right against the Estate.

The bona ﬁde purchaser for value doctrine does not apply

c.

Tricore claims that since

it

was a bona ﬁde purchaser

invalid and, therefore, the evidence

on appeal. Doe, 160 Idaho

below and,

against outstanding and adverse rights 0f another

and Taylor

v.

Just,

rights.

Trunnell

v.

Just,

138 Idaho

is

a defense

two

cannot be raised for the

ﬁde purchaser

by one who has acquired

When purchased Without

for

title

actual 0r constructive

138 Idaho 137, 142, 59 P.3d 308, 313 (2002). The doctrine cannot be used t0

at 142,

doctrine cannot help

10

it

is

Fergel, 153 Idaho 68, 72, 278 P.3d 938, 942 (2012)

compel performance 0f a contract and acquire
v.

as such,

incorrect for

is

860, 380 P.3d at 181. Second, the bona

at

value doctrine does not apply to this case. The doctrine

knowledge ofthose adverse

any right 0f ﬁrst refusal

was properly excluded. This argument

reasons. First, Tricore never raised this argument

ﬁrst time

for value,

t0 Tricore.

it

59 P.3d at 3 13

acquire

title

10

title: it is

available t0 protect

Tricore never acquired

.

title,

title

obtained. Taylor

and the bona ﬁde purchaser

in this case.

Tricore argues that Stockton had legal remedies available to enforce the right of ﬁrst refusal rather than

“conspiring” to interfere With

its

contract, citing

Hancock 110 Idaho

provides that the holder of a right of ﬁrst refusal
another Without notice,

it

may

at 152,

715 P.2d

seek speciﬁc performance

does not limit the holder to that remedy.
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Id.

when

at

365. Although

Hancock

property has been sold to

The Estate did not

d.

Tricore contends, and the
existed, Stockton

waived

he did not purchase

it.

it

trial

offer the

same property

t0

Stockton

and Brinkmeyer.

court erroneously found, that even if the right 0f ﬁrst refusal

because the Estate previously offered him the exact same property and

This

is

wholly inaccurate and entirely unsupported by the record.

The record demonstrates
acres) to Stockton in 2014. In

that the Estate offered a portion

May

of the property (a

total

2014, the Estate approached Stockton With an offer to

0f 45

sell

45

acres 0f undeveloped frontage at the southernmost end 0f the lake, as well as Elaine Warren’s

house parcel (approximately 1.29

acres). R.

1995-1996; EX. 11

the offer because he felt that the $5.2 million asking price

(COE

was too

112-1 13). Stockton declined

high. R. 1995-1996; Tr. 552:3-

553212 (Stockton); 78829-789212 (Finney). Later, Tricore expressed an interest in purchasing the

same 45 acres plus an additional 20 acres 0f lake frontage

t0 the west.

R. 1997-998; Tr. 151218-

152:4 (Mort). At the end 0f June 2016, the Estate and Tricore signed the Tricore

of 65 acres for $2.4 million. R. 1997; EX. 213
Tricore

PSA,

the Estate

(COE

329-45); EX. 29

had never offered Stockton the option

(COE

60).

its

brieﬁng and the

were offered the exact same propertv

trial

2015. In any event, Whether such an offer was
Briefat Section I.B.1 Which

is

65 acres. See Tr.

(COE

106). Tricore’s

court’s ﬁndings that Stockton and/or

in the Tricore

PSA

is

made has no

Brinkmeyer

incorrect and clearly erroneous. R.

legal import.

See Brinkmeyer Reply

incorporated herein pursuant t0 I.A.R. 35(h).
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sale

Before signing the

to purchase the

790:10-15 (Finney); Tr. 55321-4, 574:25-575:19 (Stockton); see also EX. 8

argument throughout

PSA for the

e.

The

trial

court misapplied the law regarding improper purpose

and

l‘ustiizcation.

Tricore infers that since Stockton and Brinkmeyer didn’t elect t0 purchase the

same

property in 2014 and 2015, Stockton’s exercise 0f the right of ﬁrst refusal in 2016 must have been
for

an improper purpose. This

is

factually inaccurate

and unsupported by the record. As

set forth

above, neither Stockton nor Brinkmeyer were ever offered the same property included in the
Tricore

PSA.
Tricore then argues that otherwise justiﬁable conduct

is

rendered unjustiﬁed where

improper means are employed by a defendant. Tricore summarily concludes that the right of ﬁrst
refusal

was properly disregarded

Highland Enterprises, Ina,
pg. 33. This

is

incorrect.

v.

as evidence ofjustiﬁcation because

it

wasn’t valid, relying on

Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 986 P.2d 996 (1999). Respondent’s Brief

Highland simply noted

that While

“wrongful conduct” can be justiﬁed

if

a privilege exists, that privilege will not save the conduct if the means employed are not justiﬁed.

Id. at

344, 986 P.2d at 1010.

The question

is

whether there are sufﬁcient

conduct was proper because 0f a valid privilege that had not been misused.
101

1.

In this case, the trial court

refusal but then labeled

it

made ﬁndings

“ludicrous” and

actions. R. 2019-20. This does not,

his

good

faith reliance

on

Id. at

that established the existence

would not consider

it

v.

that the

345, 926 P.2d at

of the right of ﬁrst

faith belief that

“Wrongfulness” considers the motive (was

improper), the interests sought to be advanced, and the nature 0f the conduct.

Inc.

show

as justiﬁcation for Stockton’s

however, negate Stockton’s good

that belief.

facts t0

BECO

it

existed or

it

proper 0r

Const. C0,,

J-U—B Engineers, Ina, 145 Idaho 719, 724, 184 P.3d 844, 849 (2008). Advancing one’s

31

own legal interests
is

in

good

faith carries substantial

improper or justiﬁed. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §767 and cmt.

of Torts §773. Exercising one’s legal
v.

weight in determining Whether the interference

interests in

Pierce Cly. Med. Bureau, Inc. 131

evidence cited by the

trial court,

Wn.2d

faith belief that a valid right

failed t0 afford Stockton

EX. 8

(COE

of ﬁrst

an improper purpose. Leingang

133,156, 930 P.3d 288, 299 (1997).

None 0f

the

demonstrated that Stockton and Brinkmeyer

at trial

0f ﬁrst refusal existed, the Estate acknowledged that

an opportunity to purchase the 65 acres, and

106). Furthermore, the trial court’s

refusal,

faith is not

Restatement (Second)

R. 2015-2016, or Tricore supports the conclusion that Stockton’s

conduct was improper. Rather, the evidence

had a good

good

d;

own ﬁndings

it

sought t0 honor that

it

had

right.

established the existence 0f the right

which showed there was n0 improper purpose and proved the defense 0f

justiﬁcation.

F.

The

trial

court erred in concluding a

The

trial

court concluded that a civil conspiracy existed because

tortiously interfere with the Tricore

impose

civil liability

Tricore

now

all

parties agreed to

Estate pointed out that the law does not

where one of the alleged co-conspirators was a party

t0 the contract,

contends that the Appellants should have raised this argument during

35(h), Appellants timely raised this

In any event, there

Idaho, a civil conspiracy

P. 883,

conspiracy existed.

PSA. R. 2019. The

reasons stated in Brinkmeyer’s Reply Brief at

233

civil

is

is

argument

no dispute

II.

Which

at trial

is

For the

incorporated herein pursuant to I.A.R.

and 0n appeal.

that “civil conspiracy” is not a claim in

an agreement t0 commit a

tort.

Dahlquist

885 (1925). See also SaintAlphonsus Diversiﬁed Care,

32

trial.

and

v.

Inc.

and of itself. In

Mattson, 40 Idaho 378,

v.

MRIAssociates, LLP,

157 Idaho 106, 124

fn. 4,

334 P.3d 780, 797,

fn.

4 (2014).

conspiracy based 0n a contracting party breaching

be held

liable for the tort

its

own

N0

Idaho court has recognized a

civil

contract. Therefore, the Estate cannot

of conspiracy to breach the Tricore PSA. If the Estate cannot conspire to

breach the Tricore PSA, then Stockton and Brinkmeyer cannot conspire With
forth in the prior brieﬁng of the parties, the trial court erred

Tricore next argues that Applied Equipment Corp.

it

d0

to

so.

As

set

and must be reversed.
v.

Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd, 869 P.2d

854, 7 Cal. 4th 503 (1994) (holding that a party cannot intentionally interfere With

its

own contract)

does not apply in Idaho because the court held that allowing claims for breach 0f contract and
tortious interference

California

pg. 35-36.

would

— but Which

essentially

award punitive damages

which

are barred in

are allowed in Idaho under “certain circumstances.” Respondent’s Brief

While the Court

in

Applied made

this conclusion,

additional claims other than a breach 0f contract and

superﬂuous — just as in

in tort

this case. Id. at 484.

it

also recognized that allowing

damages ﬂowing from

The Court

that breach

further noted that allowing both a claim for

breach of contract and tortious interference would essentially allow a claim for
every case, resulting in uncertain and unpredictable results.
Tricore’s argument that punitive

damages

would be

Id.

The

situation

is

civil

the

conspiracy in

same

here.

are allowed in Idaho in “certain circumstances”

misapplies the law and misses the point. The case relied on by Tricore, Linscott
Life Ins. C0., 100 Idaho 854, 606 P.2d 958 (1980),

was decided before

v.

Rainier Nat.

the Idaho legislature

amended

the statute t0 authorize punitive damages. That statute limits the recovery of punitive

damages

to actions

clear

Where the claimant proves oppressive, fraudulent or outrageous conduct by

and convincing evidence. LC. §6- 1 604(1). The trial court
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in this case did not

ﬁnd any conduct

to ﬁt Within the statute despite Tricore’s request that

The Appellants are not

G.

iointlv

it

and severallv

d0

so.

liable for

damages.

Tricore contends that the Appellants are jointly and severally liable for

resulting

from the

civil conspiracy.

ﬁnd joint and several

liability for

Respondent’s Brief pg. 34. The

damages. The

trial

Tricore had not proven additional damages at

trial court,

all

damages

however, did not

court ordered speciﬁc performance, ruled that

trial,

and awarded joint and several

liability for

attorney fees only. R. 2020-2025.
Tricore’s argument for tort-based joint and several liability for

the

trial

ﬁnd the

court did not

contract,

2018-19.

Estate liable in

breached the duty of good

As

faith

and

such, any attempt t0 impose

The

tort.

trial

fair dealing,

damages

is

errant because

court held that the Estate breached the

and violated the I.C.P.A. R. 2010-1

“damages” 0n a joint and several basis based

1;

R.

in tort is

not warranted.

H.

The

trial

court erred bv finding a Violation 0f the Idaho

Under Idaho law,
the I.C.P.A t0 apply.

(2016).

As

Tricore

PSA

set forth

there

Doble

v.

Consumer Protection

must be an actual contractual relationship between the

Interstate

Act.

parties for

Amusement, Ina, 160 Idaho 307, 309, 372 P.3d 362, 364

above, there was no valid contract between the Estate and Tricore because the

does not comply with the statute of frauds, there was no meeting 0f the minds, and

Tricore repudiated

it.

As

such, the I.C.P.A does not apply, and the

reversed. Taylor v McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846, 243 P.3d 642,

did apply, the

trial

court’s decision

and competent evidence. Duspiva

must be reversed because
v.

Fillmore,

it

trial

court’s ruling

662 (2010). Even

if the

was not supported by

must be
I.C.P.A

substantial

154 Idaho 27, 31, 293 P.3d 651, 655 (2013).
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Tricore’s argument that there

was “deceptive conduct”

603(17) was not supported by substantial evidence

constituting Violation 0f I.C.P.A §48-

at trial. Tricore’s

argument 0f “deceptive”

conduct focused on the following exchange of e-mails between September
2016: (1) 0n September

1,

1

could not conﬁrm any such meeting but did not

it

an agreement With Stockton and Brinkmeyer; and
it

7,

2016, the Estate arranged a tentative meeting With Mr. Lempesis for

September 6 Without mentioning negotiations With Stockton and Brinkmeyer;
the Estate told Tricore

and September

(3)

0n September

tell

6, the

(2)

0n September

Tricore

it

2,

had signed

Estate informed Tricore

decided to g0 in another direction. Respondent’s Brieﬁ pg. 28-29.

The

Estate had

n0 obligation

t0

meet With Tricore

t0 discuss additional concessions.

The

meeting that the Estate “failed” t0 conﬁrm was not a meeting t0 discuss closing the Tricore PSA.
It

was a meeting Tricore wanted s0

new terms.“ The
is

The

trial

trial court’s

The

I.

could continue t0 demand $880,000 in concessions and add

Estate’s decision not t0

not “deception.” The

I.

it

trial

conﬁrm

the meeting t0 hear Tricore repeat

court erred in ﬁnding deceptive conduct

its

0n the part 0f the

demands

Estate.

attornev fee award was error.

court erred in ﬁnding the Appellants jointly

and severally

liable for

Tricore ’s attorney fees.

The

trial

First,

by

contract.

court erred in awarding attorney fees for at least four reasons.

a court cannot award attorney fees and costs unless they are authorized by statute

Idaho Power C0.

449 (1981); I.R.C.P.

11

After

all,

the

54(e)(1).

v.

Idaho Pub.

Utils.

Comm’n, 102 Idaho 744, 751, 639 P.2d 442,

There was no contract between Tricore and Stockton 0r

new terms demanded by Tricore

01‘

PLBM,

including the water system, water rights, and ﬁll dirt were never part

of the Tricore PSA. Tricore could hardly have thought that the parties were working toward a closing on that contract.
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LLC

and thus no contractual basis for the award against them. The
Second, the

fees

based on a

trial

civil

conspiracy t0 tortiously interfere with the Tricore PSA. R. 2019-2020; 2024.

Alphonsus Diversiﬁed Care, 157 Idaho

concluded that the

But

that

was

civil

law provides

application of I.C. §12-120(3). Thirsty’s L.L.C.
(2006). See also Northwest Bec-Corp.

fees

court attempted t0

on

is

at 129,

limited t0 the underlying cause 0f

334 P.3d

at 803.

The

trial

court ﬁrst

conspiracy was based 0n the tortious interference of all parties. R. 2020.

error because Idaho case

270 (2002) (no

court erred in s0 ruling.

court held the Appellants jointly and severally liable for Tricore’s attorney

Tricore’s entitlement t0 relief for a civil conspiracy claim

action. Saint

trial

Tolerico, 143 Idaho 48, 51, 137 P.3d 435,

Home Living Service,

its

ﬁndings

after notices

438

136 Idaho 835, 842, 41 P.3d 263,

claims under I.C. § 12-120(3)). Perhaps realizing

tort

amend

v.

v.

that tortious interference cannot the basis for

the

trial

0f appeal were ﬁled t0 conclude that the

civil

its error,

conspiracy was based on an agreement t0 breach the Tricore PSA. But that was also error because

n0 Idaho

Under

statute allows for

an award of attorney fees for

either set 0f the trial court’s

ﬁndings 0f

fact

civil

conspiracy t0 breach a contract.

and conclusions 0f law,

it

erred in awarding

attorney fees.
Third, after notices 0f appeal

its

ﬁndings of

ruling

—

Idaho,

NA.

fact or conclusions

particularly

v.

When n0

were ﬁled, the

trial

court did not have jurisdiction t0

of law to change the basis for the attorney fee award — or any

party requested that

it

do

so. I.A.R. 14(b)(3); First Sec.

Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 268, 805 P.2d 468, 474 (1991);

Comm ’rsfor Ada

amend

Bank 0f

Lowery v. Board ofCounZy

County, 115 Idaho 64, 71, 764 P.2d 431,438 (Ct. App. 1988) (Once an appeal

has been ﬁled, the lower tribunal

is

deprived of the jurisdiction necessary to correct

36

its

decision).

Because the
law,

its

trial

attorney fee

award based thereon must be reversed. See R. 23 1 0-23 16.

Lastly, the trial court

awarded attorney fees against

several liability.” R. 2316. This

classic case for joint

was

and several

parties concurrently cause

error.

liability”

PLBM, LLC

The

0n case law

trial

at

Appellants based 0n

for the

is liable

ﬁnd the

and n0 reported case

awarded

in Idaho has

and

its

“when

could not have acted concurrently in

tortfeasors mutually liable for attorney fees

137 P.3d

stating

court did not

Tricore. In addition, attorney fees are not normally

tortious interference,

all

court premised

trial

an injury, each tortfeasor

2316. (citation omitted). However, the

Stockton and

amended ﬁndings 0f fact and conclusions 0f

court lacked jurisdiction t0 enter

conclusion

tortious acts

The

trial

that,

“This

is

a

0f several

tort.

As

such,

With the Estate t0 injure

for tort claims, such as claims for

found joint and severally

costs. See, e.g., Thirsty

’s

liable

L.L.C. 143 Idaho at 51,

438. Joint and several liability does not apply to this case and the

2.

and

oint

whole 0f the damage.” R.

Estate liable in

tort

“j

trial

court erred in awarding attorney fees under the Idaho

court erred.

Consumer

Protection Act.

The

trial

two reasons.

court erred in awarding attorney fees under the I.C.P.A against the Appellants for

First, as

was

tortious conduct

such,

all parties

discussed above, the decision to award attorney fees jointly and severally for
in error because the trial court did not

could not have acted concurrently in

ﬁnd

the Estate liable in tort and, as

tort to injure Tricore.

Second, the

did not award fees under the I.C.P.A until after notices of appeal were ﬁled,
jurisdiction t0

d0

so.

The

trial

court erred on both counts and must be reversed.
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when

trial

it

court

lacked

The

3.

trial

court erred in awarding attorney fees t0 Tricore because

it

failed t0

aggortion them.

Perhaps realizing that the

trial

court erred in awarding attorney fees 0n a joint and several

basis, Tricore shifts its focus to general authority that a trial court

result at trial.

Respondent’s Brieﬁ pg. 37, citing Clarke

v.

need only consider the overall

Latimer, 165 Idaho

1, 6,

437 P.3d

1,

6

(Idaho 2018).

To

the contrary, Tricore’s failure t0 apportion attorney fees and costs regarding the claims

asserted against Stockton and

PLBM, LLC

precludes an award 0f any attorney fees and costs.

“Wherefees [are] not apportioned between a claim that qualiﬁes under I.C. § 12-120(3) and one
that does not,

n0 fees are

t0

be awarded.” Rockefeller

577, 585 (2001) (emphasis added); see also Weaver
887, 892

(1

v.

v.

Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 645, 39 P.3d

Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497, 502, 927 P.2d

996) (n0 fees 0r costs can be awarded “where the party claiming entitlement to the fees

[has] not isolated 0r separated the fees attributable t0 the contract claim

from those

another claim not covered by I.C. § 12-120(3)”). Albeit erroneously, the
attorney fees based

0n

joint

and several

Estate breached a contract and

fees

between each
4.

As

was not

distinct claim.

Tricore

is

liability in tort.

But since the

liable in tort, Tricore

Because

it

failed to

d0

s0,

it

court imposed

court concluded the

trial

was obligated

trial

attributable t0

to apportion attorney

cannot recover any attorney

fees.

not entitled t0 attorney fees 0n appeal.

set forth in its initial brieﬁng, this

Court should award the Estate

its

attorney fees

on

appeal and deny Tricore’s request for attorney fees.
Tricore’s additional request for attorney fees

38

0n appeal pursuant t0

I.C.

§12-121 should be

when

also denied. Fees are not warranted under that statute

signiﬁcant legal issues are raised 0n appeal. Ackerschott

Idaho 223, 457 P.3d 875, 890 (2020); see also Nunez

P.3d 1018, 1024, 1025

(Ct.

App. 2018). The

court on appeal to second-guess the

trial

v.

good-faith legal arguments and

Mountain View Hospital, LLC, 166

Johnson, 163 Idaho 692, 698-699, 417

v.

statute only applies

court

by re-weighing

the trial court incorrectly applied well-established law.

when

a party simply asks the

the evidence or fails to

Bergeman

v.

show

that

Select Portfolio Servicing,

164 Idaho 498, 502-503, 432 P.3d 47, 51-52 (2018).

The Appellants have demonstrated
based 0n the record presented

at trial.

that the trial court’s

The Appellants have

improperly applied clear Idaho law in numerous

Based on the forgoing, the
trial

court’s

Tricore
In

its

is

Estate, Stockton,

and

PLBM, LLC request that this

its

Court

attorney fees and costs.

CROSS-APPEAL ARGUMENT

not entitled t0

monev damages.

cross—appeal, Tricore argues that in addition t0 speciﬁc performance, the

should have also awarded
41-42. But

does not apply and Tricore’s request

CONCLUSION

judgment and award the Estate
III.

A.

statute

tort

damages

money damages and

plaintiff cannot obtain

own

be denied.
II.

reverse the

further demonstrated that the trial court

critical respects, often in contradiction t0 its

ﬁndings 0f fact, warranting reversal. The attorney fee
for attorney fees should

ﬁndings were clearly erroneous

for “loss 0f use”

trial

court

and “reliance.” Respondent’s Brief pg.

speciﬁc performance are mutually exclusive remedies and a

both t0 compensate for the same breach 0f contract. Wilson

39

v.

Hayes, 77

A.3d 392, 406 (D.C. 2013).

The reason why speciﬁc performance and money damages
is

obvious.

An order of speciﬁc performance is designed t0 force a party to perform

a contractual obligation that remains outstanding,
It is

way

are mutually exclusive

i.e.,

un-fulﬁlled and

still

owing.

not designed to bludgeon a party into re-enacting the performance in a different
or

by a new methodology

See also Campbell

Parkway Surgery

v.

(2015) (where the

that the plaintiff would

Center,

court ordered

trial

remedy and

that contract

Id.

LLC, 158 Idaho 957, 969, 354 P.3d 1172, 1184

money damages and

performance t0 avoid double recovery). Here, the
the appropriate

have preferred.

trial

damages

declined t0 consider speciﬁc

court found that speciﬁc performance

(the difference

was

between the contract price and

market value 0f the property on the day of the breach, plus consequential damages) were not
appropriate. R. 2021.

B.

The

trial

The

trial

court correctly analyzed the issue of damages.

court correctlv found that conﬂicting evidence 0f value precluded

damages.

Even if Tricore was
those damages at

trial.

entitled to

At the

damages

in addition to speciﬁc performance,

outset, Tricore argues that the property is

$2,680,000.00 and $7,009,520” and, as such,

it

it

did not prove

worth somewhere between

was deprived 0f damages somewhere between

$280,000 and $4,609,520.00 for loss ofuse and increased value during a two-year period. The

trial

court correctly determined that the evidence did not establish these damages.

As

the

trial

court correctly noted, the party claiming

only the right to damages, but the amount of damages. Fish

12

Tricore’s argument that the assessed value 0f the property

trial in

2018 was $2.9 million. R. 2381; 2409-241

1;

2421.

40

is

damages has the burden
v.

$7,009,520

t0

prove not

Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 130, 391

is

incorrect.

The taX-assessed value

after

P.2d 344, 346 (1964); R. 2023. The law does not permit damages based 0n pure conjecture.
Thurston Enterprises, Inc.

Safeguard Business Systems, Ina, 164 Idaho 709, 727, 435 P.3d 489,

v.

507 (2019.); R. 2023. Findings 0f the

when based upon

substantial

trial

court on the question of

damages

and competent evidence. Caldwell Land and

Thermal Systems, Ina, 165 Idaho 787, 800, 452 P.3 809, 822 (2019)

will not be set aside

Cattle,

LLC v.

citing Weitz

v.

Johnson

Green, 148

Idaho 851, 857, 230 P.3d 743, 749 (2010).

The

trial

court found that traditional contract

price and the market value 0f the property

damages

(the difference

0n the day 0f the breach, plus consequential damages)

were not appropriate. R. 202 1. The trial court reached that conclusion
of highly qualiﬁed, experienced appraisers from
in the value”

in value”

0f the property. R. 2021. The

was due

t0 the existence

those lots at a proﬁt, the

trial

trial

m

parties that demonstrated a

it

Corps of Engineers (the

and by no means

lots,

and

court heard “several days 0f conﬂicting testimony 0n this issue”

that

it

trial

was “extremely unlikely

and

that acquiring this permit

certain.” R. 2022. This is because Tricore

that the

court noted that in order to dredge

would need a Section 404(b) permit from

M)

“huge variation

could ﬁll the wetland, subdivide the property into

property could be developed and subdivided.” R. 2021. The
ﬁll the wetlands, Tricore

testimony

court concluded that the resulting “huge variation

and heard testimony from the Appellants’ experts opining

and

after balancing the

of wetlands. R. 2021.

Although Tricore alleged that
sell

between the contract

the United States

Army

was “expensive, time-consuming,

would have

t0 follow a deliberate

mitigation sequence including (1) avoiding impact to wetlands; (2) if impact cannot be avoided,

minimizing that impact; and

(3)

compensating for that impact. R. 2022. Tricore planned t0 develop
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around the wetlands and possibly purchase credits from a wetlands bank to compensate for
unavoidable impact, but the

an investment of at

trial

court found that this

least 1.5 years before Tricore

would

could

cost millions of dollars and require

sell lots.

These ﬁndings were supported by substantial evidence
Morse, calculated the

fair

R. 2022.

at trial.

Appellants’ expert,

market value 0f the property to be $2,680,000. EX. 254

Tr. 149525-25. Tricore’s expert,

Steven Hall, valued the property

at

(COE

Ed

551-709);

$5,445,000. EX. 723

(COE

835-91 8). However, Mr. Hall’s opinion 0f value was predicated 0n the “extraordinary assumption”
that the property could actually

be developed

in order t0 develop the property

and

(i.

e.,

Tricore could have secured

ﬁll the wetlands.) EX.

Hall valued the property 0n an “as entitled” basis, as if
the 27 lots

were ﬁnished and ready

t0 sell. EX.

254 (COE

254 (COE

at

all

permits necessary

558, 564, 568-569). Mr.

all

required permits had been issued and

at

558-69). Mr. Hall conceded he had n0

wetlands expertise and n0 familiarity with the Section 404 permitting process. Tr. 995:5-985225.
Instead,

Mr. Hall relied entirely 0n a report prepared by Tricore’s wetlands expert,

Tom

Duebendorfer, in a failed attempt to support the premise that a Section 404 permit would have

been issued.

EX. 254

Duebendorfer,

Who

(COE

at

558);

Tr.

961:2-96224. That attempt failed because Mr.

authored the report 0n Which Mr. Hall relied, insisted that

it

would be

“conjecture” t0 assume that Tricore would have obtained a Section 404 permit to develop the
wetlands, that the report

was

for “informational purposes only,” that he

“comfortable” submitting the report t0 the

and

that Tricore’s prospects

would not have been

USACE in support of a Section 404 permit application,

0f obtaining a Section 404 permit would have been

uncertain in light of the public

comment that such an

42

application

all

would have generated.

the

more

Tr. 1156;

Tr. 1165-1 167, 1167:8-1 170:8, 1170:15-1 171:1, 1171:13-1 172:1;

Tricore’s argument for

Mr. Mort admitted
not even

know

at trial that

if the

damages

at trial

was

further

See also EX. 246

(COE

at 992).

undermined by Mr. Mort’s testimony.

he believed Tricore’s expected proﬁts were speculative, that he did

property could be developed, that he did not

know whether the proj ect

could

be permitted, and that he had not consulted With anyone to apply for a Section 404 permit.

Tr.

332:13-33427, 34515022, 29226-15, 295:25-296zl-14.
Appellants’ wetlands expert, Jason Scott,

Who

404 permit application process roughly 50 times,

has helped developers navigate the Section

Tr. 1350: 17-1351:12,

completely disagreed that

Tricore could have obtained a Section 404 permit t0 develop the property. Mr. Scott testiﬁed that
Tricore did not follow the required three-step sequence 0f avoidance, minimization, and

mitigation.

Tr. 137127-1372.

Mr. Scott testiﬁed

that,

based upon his analysis 0f the proposed

development, Tricore had ignored the ﬁrst two steps and tried to skip straight to the

third,

mistakenly assuming that obtaining a Section 404 permit was as easy as buying wetlands credits.
Tr. 1372: 17-25; see also Tr. 1387: 14-138822.

Mr. Scott testiﬁed that Tricore completely failed

to

account for the environmental sensitivity 0f the property and that the presence 0f bull trout habitat,
in particular,

would have

triggered

complex environmental reviews under the Endangered Species

Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and other federal statutes that

further uncertainty into the application process.

further testiﬁed that there

environmental reviews.

Tr.

was no

Tr. 1373-1374219, 1378:8-1382218.

indication that Tricore

138322-14;

would have

see also EX.

would have been

260 (COE

at

injected

Mr. Scott

able t0 pass

750-753) (explaining

environmental review requirements and opining that Tricore could not have satisﬁed them).
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Finally,

Mr. Scott testiﬁed that Tricore would have faced signiﬁcant opposition from the public.

Based upon

his experience, environmental groups like the Selkirk Conservation Alliance

have taken advantage of the public comment process t0
development.

been able

Tr.

1376-1378. In short,

to secure a Section

404 permit

it

for

was Mr.
its

stall

0r even prevent the proposed

Scott’s opinion that Tricore

(COE 744-763

Appellants’ expert appraiser,

at Tr.

met With

Morse

the

Ed Morse, took

much more

have been ﬁnancially

1488:10-1496z4.

Director,

J.

more

sensible approach accounting for

404 permitting process. EX. 254 (COE 551—

and met with the

USACE.

the permit process,

Tr. 1483, 1488.

detailed approach t0 determine Whether a development

feasible, relying

geotechnical engineer,

the

Morse made a public records request regarding

Bonner County Planning

also utilized a

Tr. 1367:24-136828,

1387:14-138822, 1452:10-145324.

the substantial uncertainty inherent in the Section

709); Tr. 1467:10-146927. Mr.

would not have

proposed proj ect, and he completely disagreed With

Mr. Hall’s extraordinary assumption that the property could be developed.
1452:10-145324; EX. 260

would

Mr.

would

on more accurate cost inputs prepared by Appellants’

Gordon, and running three different scenarios.

Tr. 1476:23-1483z5,

Mr. Morse concluded that even under the scenario most favorable to Tricore,

which he considered “very

optimistic,” the project

was not ﬁnancially

feasible. Tr. 149026-149225,

1494:21-149524. Mr. Morse thus concluded that the property was worth $2,680,000 in September

2016. EX. 254

(COE

at

Ultimately, the

621); Tr. 1495.

trial

court correctly concluded that

damages were not appropriate given the

wide disparity 0f values assigned by the appraisers and the

false

assumption that Tricore would

ever get the appropriate permits t0 set such a high value. Expert testimony supported the conclusion
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was based 0n

and the

trial

C.

Tricore failed t0 prove “loss 0f use” damages.

court’s ruling

Even

if Tricore

for “loss 0f use” at

were

trial.

As

entitled t0

set forth

substantial evidence

and should not be reversed.”

money damages, which

it is

not,

it

did not prove damages

above, Tricore had the burden t0 prove the right t0 damages

and the amount 0f those damages. Those damages cannot be based 0n pure speculation or
conjecture.

While Tricore argues on appeal

(largely based

that

it

presented evidence to substantiate damages

0n Mr. Mort’s conclusory, self—serving testimony), the

trial

court concluded, “The

$2.5 million ﬁgure for loss ofuse 0f the property appears to be pulled out ofthin

and evidence

At

at trial is insufﬁcient t0

trial,

support

it.”

air.

The testimony

R. 2023.

Tricore’s evidence for “loss 0f use”

damages was based 0n Mr. Hall’s

appraisal,

discussed above. Mr. Hall’s appraisal incorporated development costs that were provided by
Tricore. EX.

72

(COE at 903). Mr. Hall did not, however, verify those costs. Id.

accepted the costs

at face value. Tr. 946: 14-947z9,

no experience with the development 0f wetland

Instead, he simply

1000:15-100514. Mr. Mort admitted that he had

ﬁll requiring a Section

404 permit, rendering

all

such estimates as pure conjecture and diminishing any likelihood of probability or proﬁtability.
Tr. 278122-27927.

Mr. Mort further conceded that these development costs were “guesstimates”

and that they “would be guesstimates

13

Tricore

is

until

you got through the process and

not entitled to recover lost proﬁts because

it

did not seek them, the

trial

the permitting t0

know

court did not award them, and the

Tricore PSA does not provide for recovery of such damages. See Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Ina, 136
Idaho 879, 884-885, 42 P.3d 672, 677-678 (2002) (“Lost proﬁts are generally not recoverable in contract unless there
is something in that contract that suggests that they were Within the contemplation 0f the parties and are proved with

reasonable certainty.”).
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what you needed

exactly

t0 d0.” Tr.

costs increased “35 t0 45 percent”

296220-297zl7, 300223-301:17. Mr. Mort’s testimony that

is

of

little

meaningful assistance because

it is

based 0n his

ofﬂland comment that “we deﬁnitely are going t0 have more costs” and nothing more. Tr. 205 25:

206:6. Tricore also provided absolutely n0 expert testimony (other than Mr. Mort’s general, self-

serving,

and unsupported opinion) 0f increased costs as contended by Tricore 0n appeal. Instead,

Tricore pins

its

hopes 0n the Appellants’ expert, John Gordon,

Who

testiﬁed, that, in general,

construction costs went up for everyone Tr. 13 16: 19-13 1 7: 7; Tr. 13 1 8: 2-5. That
0r competent evidence. There

had n0 basis

in fact,

was

by

the

not substantial

substantial evidence at trial that Tricore’s estimates 0f damages

were not based on any reasonable

as correctly concluded

is

trial court.

certainty,

and were “pulled out 0f thin

Tricore simply did not meet

its

burden

t0

show

air”

“loss 0f

use” damages.

D.

Tricore failed t0 prove “funds expended” damages.
Tricore argues that the evidence demonstrated $ 1 70,000.00 in damages for work “no longer

usable” because 0f the two-year delay.

“somewhere near” $170,000 had been

It

based

spent,

this

hypothesis 0n Mr. Mort’s testimony that

and general reference

to billing. Tr. 207:10-208225.

Tricore failed t0 prove “funds expended” damages for two reasons.

First,

trial

as to

Tricore failed to prove any basis for these damages. Tricore presented n0 evidence at

when

these funds were expended. Tricore never provided any evidence at

funds were expended
that date

m

the Tricore

would have been spent

terminated in early January 2016

as t0

PSA. EX. 213 (COE 329-345). Funds expended

in reliance

when

trial

on Addendum #1

Tricore refused t0 put

46

to the Warren/Tricore

what

prior to

PSA, which

down hard earnest money at the end

of its due diligence period, 0r during the ensuing
Tr. 799-802: 19, 1541-1542:4.

a contract that

failure t0

2016,

is

it

six

months when the

parties

were out of contract.

Obviously Tricore could not recover funds expended in reliance 0n

allowed t0 lapse, 0r

at

a time

when

document when these funds were spent

there

was n0

contract in place.

in relation to the Tricore

PSA

Tricore’s

date in late June

another failure t0 prove damages With reasonable certainty. General Auto Parts C0,, Ina,

132 Idaho

at 859,

979 P.2d

at

1217.

Second, Tricore failed t0 prove that

was

it

the entity that expended the funds.

Mr. Mort

testiﬁed that Tricore had zero employees. Tr. 2 1 3: 13-24, 345: 1 5-18. That testimony could not be

squared with Tricore’s claim for “internal staff and time” for these alleged damages Tr. 20829-25.
If Tricore has

no employees,

“internal staff and time.”

paid by other entities

To

it

stood t0 reason that Tricore itself did not expend any funds on

the extent that Tricore received assistance

owned by Mr. Mort,

was not compensable because

trial

from employees who were

testimony demonstrated that those employees’ time

the other entities

were not parties

to the Tricore

PSA. The trial

court

properly refused t0 award “funds expended” damages.

E.

Tricore failed t0 prove damages under the Idaho
Tricore argues that the Idaho

and again argues

Consumer Protection

Act.

Consumer Protection Act requires an award 0f actual damages

that the trial court should

have awarded “loss 0f use” damages. Respondent’s

Brieﬁ pg. 44. In order to recover actual damages under
ascertainable loss and if this burden

is

not met a

Wood, 124 Idaho 342, 344, 859 P.2d 378, 380

(Ct.

trial,

I.C. §

48-608(1), Tricore had t0 prove an

no damages can be awarded. Jackson

App. 1993). As

set forth above, the trial court

found that the alleged damages for “loss 0f use” were “pulled out 0f thin
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v.

air,”

and

this

ﬁnding was

supported by substantial evidence. The

trial

court’s refusal t0

award damages should be upheld

because there was no evidence t0 establish damages With reasonable certainty and because they

were based on speculation and conj ecture.

CONCLUSION

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the Estate, Stockton, and

afﬁrm the

trial

court’s ruling that Tricore

is

PLBM, LLC

request that this Court

not entitled t0 damages, and reject Tricore’s request

for attorney fees.

DATED: August

18,

2020.
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